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The intention of this thesis is to explore the factors that led to the success of two Latin 
American revolutions in Cuba (1959) and the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua (1979).  
While insurgent movements have proliferated in Latin America since the Spanish 
“conquest,” these are the only two that, in the post-World War II era, have taken power 
by overthrowing the incumbent regimes by force of arms.  Understanding the most 
prominent factors that led to the success of these revolutions will aid in identifying the 
potential for success of current and future insurgents.   
This thesis hypothesizes that the four critical factors that contributed to the 
success of the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions are leadership (strategy), popular 
support (the ability of the insurgents to assemble a popular constituency for their message 
and program), external factors (degree of support in the international environment), and 
military impact (the personalistic, repressive, corrupt, and unprofessional armed forces).  
In other words, an analysis of these four factors as they relate to both revolutions will 
provide the best critical approaches to explain success.   
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The intention of this thesis is to explore the factors that led to the success of two 
Latin American revolutions in Cuba (1959) and the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua 
(1979).  While insurgent movements have proliferated in Latin America since the 
Spanish “conquest,” these are the only two that, in the post-World War II era, have taken 
power by overthrowing the incumbent regimes by force of arms.  Understanding the most 
prominent factors that led to the success of these revolutions will aid in identifying the 
potential for success of current and future insurgents.  This thesis will seek to answer the 
following questions: First, why did the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions succeed in 
seizing power?  Second, while recognizing that these revolutionary successes were 
contingent events, are there factors that persist in the political, economic, and social 
environments in Latin America that might cause similar upheaval in the future?  
In the past decade, the United States and its allies have had to confront 
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, while providing security assistance to other 
countries confronted by insurrectionary movements.1  Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, 
however, U.S. intervention in Latin America post-Vietnam has been of the “small 
footprint” variety.  This was most notably the case in El Salvador (1979–1992) and 
Colombia since 1999, and is likely to remain the method of intervention in the future. 
Therefore, by studying these two insurgent successes in that region, one can better 
understand the strategic environment and the contingent circumstances of each so as 
better to craft policies and strategies to preempt or curtail insurgent threats to regional 
stability.   
The Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions have become part of a narrative of 
insurgent success that inspires some revolutionaries and Latin American political 
militants even today.  The Cuban Revolution especially is a fading if tarnished symbol of 
                                                
1 Colombia, Philippines, Mali, and some others. 
 2 
leftist triumph.  The survival of these revolutions despite or even because of the 
opposition of the United States, demonstrate that the leadership won for both revolutions 
a modicum of domestic and international legitimacy.  Politically, both countries 
transformed from a right leaning political regime to a leftist regime, but used very 
different strategies.  Each recast the economic foundations of their country—economic 
policies in Cuba changed drastically with the nationalization of major industries and the 
curtailment of ties with the United States.  In Nicaragua, on the other hand, while the 
Sandinistas were also at loggerheads with the Reagan administration, which actively tried 
to overthrow them, the regime sought to diversify their economy and become less 
dependent on limited trading partners while promoting private investments.  In fact, after 
the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, Fidel Castro advised them not to be too radical in 
their revolution.  He further advised them not to make the same mistakes he had made, to 
allow private enterprises in their country to grow the economy, and to be tolerant of 
multi-party politics.2   
Both countries also reorganized their militaries to fit regime political ideology.  
For the Cubans, conservative officers and soldiers were removed from the ranks or self-
exiled.  An estimated 550 personnel were executed who were alleged supporters of the 
Batista regime and/or were accused of murder and torture.3 In the case of Nicaragua, the 
National Guard was completely “destroyed and replaced by a new armed forces that was 
‘explicitly Sandinist.’”4  Ultimately, both militaries, led by radical revolutionary 
commanders, immediately became a mainstay of their respective regimes.5   
A study of the success of the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions can provide 
insights specific to Latin America, which may help to orient current and future policy 
options and security assistance approaches in the region.  
                                                
 2 William R. Long, “Radicalism Not Necessary, Castro Advises Sandinistas” Los Angeles Times, 
January 13, 1985, http://articles.latimes.com/1985-01-13/news/mn-8685_1_castro-advises-sandinistas. 
3 James DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
2007), 207. 
4 Ibid., 247. 
5 Ibid. 
 3 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Understanding the reasons for the success of these two insurgencies, and whether 
those factors might emerge in other Latin American countries, can help to inform U.S. 
policy in the region. In this study, I hypothesize that the four critical factors that 
contributed to the success of the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions were  
• leadership (strategy), 
• popular support (the ability of the insurgents to assemble a popular 
constituency for their message and program) 
• external factors (degree of support in the international environment), and 
• military impact (the personalistic, repressive, corrupt, and unprofessional 
armed forces).  
In other words, an analysis of these four factors as they relate to both revolutions 
will provide the best critical approaches to explain success.   
1.  Critical Factors in an Insurgent Revolution 
a. Leadership  
Leadership in both the government and the insurgency plays a critical role in the 
success or failure of a revolution.  The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) “Guide to 
Analysis of Insurgency 2012” explains that “an ideal insurgent leader displays charisma, 
the flexibility to balance ideology with the need to be inclusive and leverage local 
grievances, and an ability to engender loyalty and maintain group unity.”6  All three of 
the Cuban Revolution’s insurgent leaders—Fidel and Raul Castro and Ernesto “Che” 
Guevara—proved instrumental to the success of the insurgency by displaying these 
characteristics, as did Carlos Fonseca, Daniel and Humberto Ortega, and Eden Pastora in 
Nicaragua.  The insurgent leaders are extremely important to their causes because they 
provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, organization, and planning for the 
movement.  They are the “idea people” who, through their charismatic personalities, 
power the revolution and orchestrate guerrilla military efforts.7  
                                                
 6 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012, (U.S. Government, 
2012), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=713599, 10. 
 7 Tactics in Counterinsurgency FM 3-24.2, Department of the Army, accessed July 20, 2013, 
https://www.armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24x2.pdf , 2-3, 2-5. 
 4 
In the same manner, an effective incumbent government could thwart the efforts 
of insurgents by understanding the situation and implementing effective reforms and 
measured repression.  Properly selecting the institution and the “willingness and ability of 
the government leaders to act decisively and authoritatively and to compel all elements of 
the state power… to work toward a common purpose are the clearest signs of effective 
government leadership.”8  While it would be going too far to argue in the manner of 
Edward Lansdale that all one had to do is find a Ramon Magsaysay (President of the 
Philippines) to succeed, it is equally true that the unpopularity of the incumbent 
governments in Cuba and Nicaragua were the major reason for the success of both 
revolutions. Cuban President Fulgencio Batista failed to crush Castro’s forces in the 
Sierra Maestra Mountains because his military was corrupt and inept.  Like Batista, the 
regime of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza Jr. was brutal and corrupt, which 
undermined the ability of his Guardia Nacional (National Guard) to conduct a successful 
counterinsurgency.  Although the Nicaraguan National Guard was well trained and 
equipped, counterinsurgency tactics applied in a political vacuum were bound to fail.  
The corruption and repression, as noted by the U.S. Army’s “Tactics in 
Counterinsurgency” manual (FM 3-24.2), “can lead to popular dissatisfaction with the 
current government.  Rampant corruption leads to the loss of HN [host nation] legitimacy 
and possibly a desire to change or replace the Host Nation government.”9 
b. Popular Support 
According to the CIA’s report on analyzing insurgencies, “insurgents generally 
rely on the civilian population for food, medicine, shelter, or intelligence—provided 
either voluntarily or under duress.”10  Well-organized insurgencies typically treat the 
civilian population well for this same reason.  In order for them to be effective against a 
superior army, “the rebel forces must have civilians’ active aid, not just their passive 
acquiescence.”11   
                                                
 8 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012, 12.  
 9 Tactics in Counterinsurgency FM 3-24.2, Department of the Army, accessed July 20, 2013, 
http://armypubs.army.mil/ doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24.pdf, 1-18. 
 10 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012, 11.  
11 Chalmers A. Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1982), 149. 
 5 
In the case of the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions, a combination of the 
insurgent’s good public relations along with government corruption and oppression 
significantly contributed to the eventual outcomes. Popular support for the insurgency is 
rooted in the basis of the population’s grievances.  The U.S. Army categorizes the 
populace’s grievances under five broad categories: identity, region, occupation or 
exploitation, economic failure, and, finally, corruption and repression.12  The government 
or the insurgency can capitalize on these grievances to promote their agenda and gain 
legitimacy through popular support.  Both Fidel Castro and Carlos Fonseca marketed an 
image of a charismatic national savior in the romantic tradition of Simón Bolivar to enlist 
popular support and to promote their cause abroad.  At the same time, the increase in 
popular support for the insurgency in both cases led the government leaders, Fulgencio 
Batista and Anastasio Somoza, to increase their violence against the population, which 
only swelled the popularity of the insurgent alternative.   
c. External Influence 
Government and the insurgency could have had external assistance, both “hard” 
and “soft,” from foreign actors such as other states, religious groups, and opposition 
groups.  Natural catastrophes may contribute to economic downturns that influence the 
political environment.  External support could consist of “diplomatic, financial, arms, 
nonlethal equipment, sanctuary, intelligence, training, or advisers—enhancing the 
political or military operations of the recipient.”13  Three root causes for insurgencies 
recognized by the U.S. Army’s “Tactics In Counterinsurgency” manual fall squarely 
under the category of external influences:  religious groups, occupiers (foreign nations), 
and economic failure.14   
In the cases of both the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions, the insurgents and the 
government found external support.  The U.S. government supported both state dictators 
through economic and military aid.  At the same time, Washington’s continued and direct 
                                                
 12 Tactics in Counterinsurgency FM 3-24.2, Department of the Army, accessed July 20, 2013, 
http://armypubs.army.mil/ doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24.pdf, 1-17 – 1-18. 
 13 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012, 15.  
14 Tactics in Counterinsurgency FM 3-24.2, Department of the Army, accessed July 20, 2013, 
http://armypubs.army.mil/ doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24.pdf, 1-17 – 1-18. The specific reference to 
religious groups is defined as (domestic or international) fundamentalism or extremism, which could 
become a root cause of an insurgency in and of itself.   
 6 
support of both governments also helped to undermine their legitimacy.  Both dictators 
were denounced as U.S. puppets, which served to fuel the opposition’s support.  
Additionally, in both cases, the pressure by the U.S. government on the regimes’ leaders 
to step-down contributed to the insurgent victories.  
d. Military Factor 
Barrington Moore noted that “it is the state of the army, of competing armies… 
that has determined the fate of twentieth-century revolutions.”15  The state’s success or 
failure against an insurgency depends on the military’s “morale, competence of 
command, training, equipment, and intelligence.”16  While the military does not 
necessarily need to take the lead in combating the insurgent threat inside a nation, in the 
example of the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions, they played the prime role in 
counterinsurgency.  Batista’s poor management of the Cuban army undermined its 
morale.  Somoza’s inability to reign-in the corruption and brutality of the National Guard 
amplified their unpopularity and undermined his legitimacy.  Both militaries lacked a 
professional officer corps required to meet their responsibilities of managing violence 
and securing their client society.  In both cases, military professionalism was severely 
lacking, the civil-military tension was at its highest, and corruption transformed the 
military into a branch of the regime’s spoils system, all of which contributed to its failure 
against an under-equipped insurgency.17   
As alluded to by Barrington Moore, insurgent military forces are equally as 
important to the triumph of the revolution.  Guerrilla movements must have sufficient 
armed capacity to endure, outlast military repression, and confront them head-on in order 
for a revolutionary transfer of power to occur.  In fact, the destruction of the insurgent’s 
                                                
15 Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 (Cambridge, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 43. 
16 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 140. 
17 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations. (Cambridge, NY: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 15. 
 7 
military “rather than loss of legitimacy wrecked most guerrilla movements.”18  It is 
therefore possible to argue that success or failure of a revolutionary movement ultimately 
comes down to their ability to field reasonably efficient military forces.19   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the process of understanding major contributing factors of a revolution’s 
success, many authors have identified prominent theories about revolutions that help 
explain their outcomes.  James DeFronzo, author of Revolutions and Revolutionary 
Movements, identifies and discusses five theories, which are generally accepted in this 
field of study—Marxist theory, frustration-aggression theory, systems theory, 
modernization theory, and structural theory.20  For instance, Marifeli Perez-Stable, author 
of The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy, notes that, “Most Cubanists have 
implicitly adhered to the premises of modernization theory.”21  DeFronzo also identifies 
five factors that are critical to the success of revolutionary movements:  mass frustration, 
elite dissidence, unifying motivation, state crisis, and a permissive world context.22   
Charles Tilly, in From Mobilization to Revolution, underscores the importance 
that a dual power struggle has on the “revolutionary situation” through his theory of 
mobilization.  He argues that the government is no longer unchallenged and that an 
opposition directly challenges its sovereignty by providing directives to the populace.  
Tilly goes as far as to say that if there is no dual power, there is no revolution.23  Timothy 
P. Wickham-Crowley, author of Exploring Revolution, directly challenges and disagrees 
                                                
18 Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and 
Revolutionary Theory (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 50; Barrington Moore, Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1966). 
19 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978), 211–216. 
20 DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 22–26. 
 21 Marifeli Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 12. 
22 DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 22. 
 23 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 190–211. 
 8 
with Tilly because, as he describes it, “dual power is not a necessary precursor to that 
joint change of both polity and society that we call revolution.”24   
Jeff Goodwin, author of No Other Way Out, posits that revolutionary movements 
do not need to be strictly in response to “economic exploitation or inequality, but also and 
more directly a response to political oppression and violence.”25  The political oppression 
and violence are brought about by the state.  Therefore, Goodwin identifies the state-
centered theory of revolution.  He favors this theory because “the success or failure of 
revolutionary movements depends more fundamentally upon the nature of the specific 
states that revolutionaries have sought to overthrow.”26  Regardless of the theory being 
discussed, four resounding factors fill the backdrops of revolution theories and provide a 
consistent theme when researching the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions:  leadership, 
popular support, external influences, and military impact.   
1.  Critical Factors in an Insurgent Revolution 
a. Leadership  
From a government leadership perspective, the actions taken by state leaders play 
a critical role in revolutionary movement outcomes.  According to Goodwin, “States 
[leaders] that regulate, reform or even abolish perceived economic and social injustices 
are less likely to become the target of political demand (revolutionary or otherwise) than 
those that are seen to cause or perpetuate such injustices.”27  On the other hand, he also 
notes that authoritarian leaders who exercise repressive and exclusionary actions against 
any sector of the population encourage and facilitate revolution.28  Specifically, 
Wickham-Crowley wrote that Batista’s campaign of terror sealed alliances between 
peasants in the Sierra Maestra and Fidel Castro’s guerrilla movement.29  Likewise, 
                                                
 24 Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and 
Revolutionary Theory, 166. 
 25 Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991, 3. 
26 Ibid., 24.   
27 Ibid., 45. 
28 Ibid., 27.  
 29 Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and 
Revolutionary Theory, 92–93. 
 9 
Walter LaFeber argues that Somoza’s corruption and injustices added to the populace’s 
frustrations.30  Theda Skocpol adds to the state leadership argument by noting that a 
proto-bureaucratic state is highly vulnerable to revolution because it gains the bulk of 
their revenue by taxing the peasantry and providing tax-exemptions for elites.31   
Wickham-Crowley coins the term mafiacracies to describe both the Cuban and 
Nicaraguan regimes during their revolutions.  Mafiacracies “showed themselves to be 
especially vulnerable to a guerilla resistance which converted itself into a mass revolution 
against an eventually isolated dictatorship.”32  
The revolutionary guerrilla leaders took advantage of circumstances created by 
poor leadership and management in the government to gain impetus for their movement.  
Wickham-Crowley identified the pact established by Fidel Castro and the peasant anti-
eviction army displeased with Batista’s regime in the Sierra Maestra Mountains.33  
LaFeber, DeFronzo, Goodwin, and Wickham-Crowley all identified similar grievance-
inspired alliances in Nicaragua’s Revolution.   
b. Popular Support 
Revolutionary movements require some degree of popular acquiescence to 
succeed.  Three of the five factors that DeFronzo identifies as critical to the success of 
revolutionary movements are directly related to popular support: mass frustration, elite 
dissidence, and unifying motivation. He also notes that the popular dissatisfaction across 
all social groups contributed to the demise of both Batista’s Cuban regime and Somoza’s 
government in Nicaragua.34   
                                                
 30 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, expanded ed. (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1984), 228–229. 
 31 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and 
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 32 Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and 
Revolutionary Theory, 212. 
33 Ibid. 
34 DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 15, 22. 
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Wickham-Crowley argues that, to succeed, revolutionaries must muster support 
across the social spectrum.35  DeFronzo plainly posits that, “for a revolution to triumph, 
several classes must join forces.”36  Furthermore, most analysts of the Cuban and 
Nicaraguan revolutions agree that mass popular support was mainly due to the 
exclusionary and repressive regimes of Batista and Somoza.   
Goodwin posits that during the Cuban Revolution the popular support shifted 
from anti-radicalism to anti-Batista.  He also states that Castro was able to gain popular 
support by taking advantage of Batista’s failures.37  DeFronzo identifies uneven 
distribution of wealth, lack of services in the rural areas, and unemployment caused by 
Batista’s corruption as reasons why Castro was able to gain broad popular sympathy for 
his guerrilla movement (M-26-7).38  The shift of popular support to the Nicaraguan 
guerrilla force (FSLN), much like in Cuba, experienced its biggest increase near the fall 
of the dictatorial regime.   
For Thomas C. Wright, Somoza’s repressive Special Antiterrorist Activity 
Brigade, responsible for dealing with the insurgency, targeted peasants, workers, and 
slum dwellers, who it assumed were supporting the guerrillas.39  The intensification of 
terror against the population by the government only served to gather further support for 
the FSLN.  Humberto Ortega, minister of Defense for the Sandinista government and 
lauded guerrilla fighter, perhaps disingenuously insisted that repression preceded the 
insurgency, rather than flowed from it. “We couldn’t say ‘no’ to the insurrection.  The 
mass movement was ahead of the vanguard’s capacity to lead it.  We couldn’t oppose that 
mass movement, that current.  We had to put ourselves at the front of the current [al 
frente de ese rio] in order to more or less direct and channel it.”40   
                                                
 35 Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and 
Revolutionary Theory, 154–161. 
36 DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 14. 
37 Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991, 62. 
38 DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 198. 
 39 Thomas C. Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution, Rev ed. (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2001), 171. 
40 Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991, 186. 
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c. External Influence 
While the conclusion of a revolution—be it a success or failure—is determined by 
domestic outcomes, external influences can have a decisive sway.  Both DeFronzo and 
Goodwin note that other nations or foreign officials can have a determining effect on the 
outcome of a revolution.  DeFronzo plainly states that “a revolutionary movement in one 
nation that appears to be overcoming the national government might be suppressed, at 
least temporarily, by other nations opposed to the success of the revolution.”41  John 
Dunn gives considerably more credit to the absence of significant and effective 
counterinsurgency assistance to the government.  Assistance, particularly in the last two 
years for the Cuban Revolution, is “perhaps even a necessary condition” to its success or 
failure.42 
A common theme among many analysts (Wickham-Crowley, LaFeber, Perez-
Stable, DeFronzo, and Wright) is that the United States played a major role in both the 
creation and outcome of the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions.  Wickham-Crowley 
notes that the habitual pattern of direct political and military intervention in both 
countries resulted in weak domestic parties.  He states that the history of U.S. 
intervention provided an opening to authoritarian regimes—mafiacracy—because 
Washington preferred stability over a legitimate democracy.43   
As Perez-Stable explains, one of the pillars that led to radical nationalization in 
Cuba, which promoted anti-Batista sentiment, was the concern over national sovereignty.  
National sovereignty was a major concern for the Cuban people because United States 
corporations owned most of the national wealth.44  LaFeber and DeFronzo also comment 
on the significant effect the Alliance for Progress—a U.S. program that aimed at raising 
Latin American living standards in the 1960s—had on the Nicaraguan Revolution.  Both 
                                                
 41 DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 17; Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States 
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state that the program inadvertently resulted in more revolts because it raised 
expectations among the populace that these governments were unwilling or unable to 
meet.45   
Conversely, Goodwin isolates the importance of how the inactions of foreign 
nations can have on the revolution’s outcome—particularly when the regime has a 
“foreign sponsor.”46  Wickham-Crowley adds that nations who do not intervene, or do 
not intercede to prevent the government’s downfall play an important role in the outcome 
of the revolution: “During the Cuban Revolution of 1956–1958 and the Nicaraguan… 
revolution[s] of 1978–1979, no nation sent military forces to save the internationally 
despised regimes of Batista, [and] Somoza.”47 
Wright, Defonzo, Perez-Stable, Anthony James Joes (author of Victorious 
Insurgencies) and Tad Szulc (author of Fidel: A Critical Portrait) convey that the United 
State’s inaction toward the M-26-7, the condemnation of Batista, the arms embargo, and 
the U.S.’ request for Batista to step aside as leader all played a crucial role at the end of 
the revolution.48  Joes quotes Earl T. Smith (U.S. ambassador to Cuba between 1957–
1959) conceding, “There can be no doubt that the decision by the State Department to 
suspend the shipment of arms to Cuba was the most effective step taken by the 
Department of State in bringing about the downfall of Batista.”49  DeFronzo, LaFeber, 
and Wright also agree that the United States played a significant role in Somoza’s demise 
by reducing military aid, publicly condemning his actions, and publicly stating that 
Nicaragua would be better off without him.50   
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In addition to the United State’s influence on the outcome of the revolution in 
Nicaragua, LaFeber and DeFronzo also identify other external actors that significantly 
contributed to the outcomes: aid to the revolutionaries by neighboring Latin American 
countries (Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama), the oil crisis in the 1970s, 
the Roman Catholic Church and liberation theology, the 1972 earthquake that devastated 
Managua, the media—specifically the killing of news reporter Bill Steward by the 
National Guard, and the Organizations of American States (OAS).   
d. Military Factor 
The military’s role in the outcome of a revolution, although not recognized by 
many authors as being a decisive factor, continues nevertheless to be a common theme 
contributing to the downfall of the Batista and Somoza dictatorships.  Wickham-Crowley 
suggests that sociologists avoid writing about the military’s role because if they “study 
the military carefully and analytically, their colleagues tend to view them as closet 
militarists.”  He further theorizes that a military’s solidarity in the face of revolution—
their willingness to stay together in defense of the present regime—is a decisive element 
in the outcome of the revolution.51 
Alain Rouquie theorizes that, “The victories of the guerrilla army in Cuba in 1959 
or the popular party-led army in 1979 in Nicaragua can be explained essentially by the 
collapse of the ruling regimes, and the demoralization of the military.”52  Wickham-
Crowley also explains that where the military “employed terror [against the opposition] 
along with civic attention [to general populace], support for the guerrilla at times simply 
crumbled.”53   
Perez-Stable, LaFeber, DeFronzo, Wickham-Crowley, and Goodwin also agree 
that the corruption and brutality of the Nicaraguan and Cuban militaries contributed the 
                                                
 51 Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and 
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success of both revolutions.54  Wickham-Crowley more specifically notes that during the 
campaign against Castro’s M-26-7, from 1956 to 1958, the Cuban army’s actions 
consisted more of terrorizing and killing peasants than successful operations against the 
guerrillas.55  The National Guard’s repression in Nicaragua, wrote LaFeber, “consisted of 
rocket-bombing the slums,” which resulted in “killing thousands of women and 
children.”56 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will employ a historical approach in identifying the critical factors that 
resulted in the success of both the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions.  In order to gain 
the most insight about these two revolutions, I will examine the insurgent life cycle as 
defined by the CIA.  Understanding the stages of the life cycle and how they would apply 
to the cases of Cuban and Nicaraguan insurgencies will help provide a better 
understanding of their outcomes.  Furthermore, identifying recognized theories of 
revolutions will contribute to this thesis by laying the theoretical foundation for studying 
the M-26-7 and FSLN’s success.  Additionally, a historical search for dominant factors 
that contributed to the success of these two revolutionary insurgent groups will help 
prove or add to my hypothesis.   
In order to set a historical background of how Batista, the Somoza family, the M-
26-7, and the FSLN rose to power, Chapter III will trace the pertinent events in these two 
revolutions.  This general understanding will help in the analysis of the Cuban and 
Nicaraguan revolutions in terms of the pre-identified factors: leadership, popular support, 
external influence, and the military factors.   
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56 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 233–234. 
 15 
The historical analysis will draw primarily from secondary sources such as books, 
country studies of Cuba and Nicaragua, government reports, and scholarly articles that 
contribute to the overall outcome of both revolutions.  Primary sources will be used, to a 
lesser extent, which will concentrate on people’s reactions to the revolutions as they were 
occurring.   Mass media and editorial printed material from the time frames of the 
revolutions will aid in the historical analysis.   
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II. UNDERSTANDING INSURGENT REVOLUTIONS 
At its most fundamental level, understanding insurgent revolutions requires a 
theoretical framework that allows for the formulation of consistent explanations to actual 
events.  Many revolution theorists have crafted theories that allow for a better 
understanding of past, present, and potential revolutionary uprisings.  With a basic 
understanding of generally accepted theories (presented in this chapter), models have 
been created to better comprehend insurgent evolution and de-evolution throughout their 
life cycle.  This chapter will progress in this same manner; starting with a discussion of 
leading theories, followed by the CIA’s model of an insurgent’s life cycle. 
A. THEORIES OF REVOLUTION 
It is through theories we can gain a better understanding of human behavior in 
regards to the hows and whys of individual and communal actions.  The attempt at 
understanding and studying revolutions is an age-old endeavor that has led to the 
development of theories aimed at explaining every aspect of revolutions. They provide a 
framework for comprehending historical events and a foundation for future research.  In 
particular, the 1960s and 1970s experienced a significant increase and revision in 
writings of revolution and political violence.  Efforts to devise explanations to 
revolutions have culminated in five leading theories: Marxist; frustration-aggression; 
systems; modernization; and structural.57  A basic understanding of these prominent 
theories allows for a deeper appreciation of the leading causes of the Cuban and 
Nicaraguan revolutions.    
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1. Marxist Theory 
In accordance with the Marxist theory, revolutionary conditions are created when 
the existing oligarchic or “bourgeois” social-political structure and leadership impede 
economic development of workers and peasants.  Karl Marx postulated that economic 
development or “modes of production” consisted of the progression through six types of 
“transitional” societies: primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, 
and communism.  Revolution is prone to occur during the transition between these 
societies because of the resulting class struggles.  Marx highlights the class conflict that 
develops between the urban industrial working class (the proletariat) and the ruling 
capitalist class (the bourgeois) during the period of capitalist industrialization.  This 
theory argues that the importance of working class labor, such as the operation of modern 
manufacturing machineries, would predictably supersede that of the ownership of capital 
in the industrialized financial system.  Capital is expressed as wealth in terms of 
resources, investments, money, or the physical means of production.   
The government-controlling bourgeois inflames class warfare, born out of the 
inherent transitions in Marxist theory, when they attempt to maintain a grip on power in the 
face of increasing demands of the lower classes.  The proletariat is driven to revolution by 
their exploitation and frustration of the capitalist industrial system.  According to Jeff 
Goodwin, “Class struggles may become particularly acute… when the existing mode of 
production has exhausted its potential for further growth and development and has entered a 
period of crisis.”58  The revolution that develops from this crisis results in armed struggle by 
the working class aimed at taking over government power in what Marx defines as “the 
dictatorship of the proletariat.”  Although the foundational premise of Marx’s theory 
previously presented remain germane, it has been greatly modified in recent years better to 
explain revolutionary outbreaks in the Third World.59  For the purpose of this thesis, a basic 
understanding of Marx’s theory of revolution justifies its explanatory power when 
studying the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions.   
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2. Frustration-Aggression Theory 
The frustration-aggression theory is a psychologically driven approach that 
attributes revolution to the state of mind of “the masses.”  The likelihood that revolution 
will occur is directly linked with the cognitive state of “deprivation” or “frustration” in 
relation to a set of goals.  It energizes the idea that “misery breeds revolt” by identifying 
the leading causes of misery or frustration in a populace.  It is important to note that a 
highly oppressive environment alone does not promote revolution under this theory.  If 
misery is generally accepted as a natural part of one’s life, people are not likely to revolt.  
Economic depression and notable transitions of an economic system are the leading 
examples that frustration-aggression theorist use to further their beliefs.  The rapid 
deterioration in material living conditions that correspond with sudden economic 
downturns introduces a wedge between people’s expectations and capacities.  The overall 
decline in the ability to attain the previously established living conditions, in this 
instance, is not attributed to a change of expectations.  James Davis, a leading political 
revolution theorist, hypothesizes that  
revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective 
economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp 
reversal….  The crucial factor is the vague or specific fear that ground 
gained over a long period of time will be quickly lost….  The background 
for political instability is economic and social progress.  A populace in a 
static socio-economic condition is very unlikely to listen to the trumpet or 
siren call to rebellion….  Progress in other words is most of the time a 
necessary but insufficient cause for violent political change.60 
A specific example that can explain an increase in deprivation occurs when a 
country is invaded and conquered by another.  If the victorious nation decides to exploit 
the natural and labor resources of the losing country, a downturn in the standard of living 
may result.  This, in turn, could lead the people of the defeated nation to challenge the 
occupier with violence.  The violence toward the victor by the oppressed populace, as a 
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result of drastic changes in social, economic, and political institutions after a war, could 
grow into a broad-based resistance movement.61   
Another contributor to the gap between the populace’s expectations and 
capabilities includes an increase in expectations without an economic trigger.  A shift to 
increased expectation for a better life without the commensurate improvements can 
promote frustration, which leads to resentment towards the status quo.62  As noted by 
Jack A. Goldstone in “The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolution,” “any 
change in a society that raises people’s expectations for a better life without providing the 
means of meeting those expectations—for example, cultural contacts with more advanced 
societies, or rapid but uneven economic growth—is likely to be politically 
destabilizing.”63  Specifically, one experience that can raise expectations is 
communication between people of other societies, where there is a higher standard of 
living with greater material wealth or where recent revolutions have led to wealth 
redistribution.64   
Similarly, a shift in moral authority can initiate change through a newly 
introduced concept or concepts that challenge the status quo.  Some theorists would 
attribute the intensification within revolutionary movements in parts of Latin America 
between the 1970s and 1980s to the role of religious leaders and their influence on 
millions of poor workers and farmers.  The shift in the Church’s message to help the poor 
in regards to social justice and redistribution of wealth on the part of a faction of clergy 
and lay people gave rise to “liberation theology,” which contributed to a climate of rising 
expectations and an environment favorable to change.65  Douglas Porch also makes note 
of this by positing that in the Latin America of the 1950s–1980s, “Liberation Theology 
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which mobilized a common Catholic vocabulary against injustice created an intellectual 
climate conducive to change.”66 
3. Systems Theory 
Systems theory, also referred to as the structural-functionalist theory, views 
societies as a system where equilibrium must be maintained in order to prevent uprisings.  
The equilibrium in society is based on the total flow of demands and resources in its 
environment and its subsystems (polity, economy, status, and culture), which make up its 
social system.  A disturbance in any of the demand and resource flows of a society 
introduces a “dysfunction” in the social system that stimulates revolution.  In other 
words, “revolution is likely to occur when prerevolutionary social structures fail to 
perform essential functions, no matter what the cause of such failure might be.”67  
According to Talcott Parsons, renowned sociologist, in order for a system to survive, it 
must perform four basic functions: 
1.  Socialization (“pattern maintenance”): The system must ensure 
that its values and norms are transmitted to children and 
immigrants…. Socialization is carried out chiefly through the 
institutions of the family and formal education, and through daily 
experiencing of societal norms that define conformity. 
2. Adaptation:  Adaptation to the environment, including the 
differentiation and assignment of roles, the distribution of scarce 
resources, and the anticipation of environmental changes.  The 
roles and norms of economic activity are devoted to meeting this 
functional need (e.g., markets, central planning institutions, and 
technological institutes).   
3. Goal-attainment:  Each actor, group, and subsystem within an 
integrated social system has one or more goals—for example, 
businesses seek to make money, churches to win converts, schools 
to educate students, mothers to protect their children, and armies to 
win battles—and the system as a whole has goals, for example, in 
relations to other systems.   
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4. Integration:  This prerequisite is fulfilled positively by roles and 
institutions that perpetuate, assert, or demonstrate the basic values 
of the system, on which integration is based—for example, the 
roles and institutions of statesmen, judicial courts of last resort, 
religious leaders, artists, creative interpreters of the culture, and 
even social critics.  It is also filled negatively through the exercise 
of authority to control deviancy, regulate conflict, and adjudicate 
disputes.  The ultimate integrative organ of a social system is the 
state—that is, the institutionalized set of roles entrusted with the 
authoritative exercise of force.68 
Although Parsons presents only one way in which a society can be studied as a 
system, systems theorists mostly agree that the leading aspect that promotes a 
revolutionary situation is a severe disequilibrium in society.  Goldstone surmises that 
when the system experiences a severe imbalance, “radical ideologies that challenge the 
legitimacy of the status quo will become widespread.  During such a period, any crisis—a 
war, a government bankruptcy, or a famine—may bring a government down.”69 
4. Modernization Theory 
Similar to the Marxist theory, modernization theory connects the potential for 
revolution with technological and economic change.  The distinction between the two 
theories is that modernization does not relate revolution to a sequence of economic 
development stages or define an economic group (class) as the linchpin to revolutionary 
transformation.  James DeFronzo states that, “modernization theory holds that the 
experience of technological and economic change tends to ‘mobilize’ new or previously 
apathetic groups by raising both their economic aspirations and their demands for 
political participation.  Revolution is likely to occur when those holding state power are 
unable or unwilling to meet the demands of groups mobilized by modernization.”70 
Modernization theorists have different explanations for the linkage of 
modernization to the development of revolutionary movements.  In general, the 
explanations focus on the differences in the components of society, which “modernize” at 
                                                
68 Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 52–54. 
69 Goldstone, The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions, 193. 
70 DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 24. 
 23 
dissimilar levels.  The first explanation, argued by Samuel Huntington, highlights that 
revolutionary uprisings are caused when a society experiences socio-economic 
modernization, but the accompanying political modernization and development is lagging 
behind.  Another explanation, influenced more by theorists of psychological motivation, 
rationalizes that the rapid increases in modernization foster a “revolution of rising 
expectations.”  Much like the frustration-aggression theory, when expectations are not 
met, widespread “frustration” and a feeling of “deprivation” is prevalent among the 
populace that encourages the feeling of revolt.71   
The final explanation, linked closely with the systems theory, argues that rapid 
modernization establishes a form of “disequilibrium” in society that affects its values and 
social structure.  Jeff Goodwin explains that, “rapid modernization destroys the 
‘integrative’ institutions that held traditional societies together, creating a sense of 
meaninglessness (or ‘anomie’) or uncertainty about one’s place in society (or ‘status 
anxiety’).  Revolutionaries, in this view, may become influential in transitional societies 
because they are able to replace the institutions that modernization undermines.”72 
5. Structural Theory  
The structural theory of revolution has taken center stage for many revolution 
theorists.  This theory focuses on the structural components of an event in society that is 
introduced through extraordinary circumstances or obstacles.  It posits that revolution is 
not solely a result of characteristics of a society (values or expectations), “but is in great 
part dependent on specific objective conditions involving political, economic, and other 
aspects of social structure.”73  Although this theory, like the Marxist theory, focuses on 
the importance of structural properties of society, it contains several fundamental 
differences.   
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Unlike the Marxist theory, structural theorists view the state as a product of social 
organization that utilizes military and administrative functions to maintain social order 
and competes in the international realm through the use of resources from society.  As 
Theda Skocpol explains in her assessment of internal (state) structural conditions, 
“administrative and military breakdowns of the autocracies inaugurated a social-
revolutionary transformation…. This result was due to the fact that widespread peasant 
revolts coincided with, indeed took advantage of, the hiatus of government supervision 
and sanctions.”74 
Another fundamental difference between the Marxist and structural theories is the 
inclusion of the international realm.  Structural theory takes into account a more global 
environment when postulating about revolutions.  It contributes the conflicts among 
nations at dissimilar states of technological and economic development to the potential 
for revolution.  With a background on dependency theory, this aspect of the structural 
theory plainly postulates what Skocpol eloquently explains, namely that “modern social 
revolutions have happened only in countries situated in disadvantaged positions within 
international arenas.”  This disadvantage ascends from the “internationally uneven spread 
of capitalist economic development and nation-state formation on a world scale.”75 
B. INSURGENT LIFE CYCLE  
In addition to providing theories, the study of revolution has also allowed for the 
creation of models to better understand the specifics of each insurgency.  While each 
insurgency is unique in terms of grievance, historical development, social composition, 
political ideology, leadership and organization, geographical setting and nature, and 
quality of its opponents, fundamentally insurgency is about weaker actors seeking to 
overthrow a stronger incumbent. Therefore, in the view of some students of 
counterinsurgency (COIN), to succeed insurgencies must satisfy certain commonalities of 
development and pass through common stages to victory.  In many respects, this is 
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simply a cold war counterinsurgent’s mirror view of Mao’s three stages of insurgency, 
beginning with weak actors engaged in hit-and-run missions against a stronger opponent 
while constructing a political, social, and economic base to sustain a revolution. A second 
attritional stage occurs when the insurgency develops operational parity and a more or 
less secure territorial base or enclaves to wear down the incumbent power. A final phase 
occurs when the insurgent achieves operational superiority and is able to overwhelm his 
opponent in conventional battle. But even counterinsurgents admit that this classic Maoist 
revolutionary paradigm has occurred only in China in the 1930s and 1940s, and in 
Indochina (1945–1975). Therefore, because the developments and outcomes of 
insurgency historically have been far more complex, instead of an ideal linear 
progression, insurgencies in the classic cold war sense may elect to skip stages, revert to 
earlier stages in a tactical adjustment, succumb before achieving success, or negotiate to 
achieve at least some of their goals.  Additionally, although a general timeline is 
represented in Table 1 below, the amount of time to progress through each stage of the 
life cycle was likely to vary.76  
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Figure 1.  Insurgency Life Cycle77 
It is of note that this model is considered out of date (and most certainly always 
was) in an era of “post-modern” insurgencies and terrorist groups like the Taliban, Al 
Qaeda or Boko Haram. However, as the two insurgencies considered in this thesis took 
inspiration from “Marxist” or adapted Maoist and quasi-Marxist ideas and blueprints for 
revolutionary success, and operated at the height of the cold war when this intellectual 
paradigm was in fashion among both insurgents and counterinsurgents, it provides a 
useful and historically sensitive framework for analysis. 
The four stages identified by the CIA that compose the insurgent life cycle are the 
preinsurgency stage, the incipient conflict stage, the open insurgency stage, and the 
resolution stage.  As an insurgency progresses through these stages, the actions 
performed at each stage are continuous and cumulative in nature.  The factors in each 
stage build on each other and remain relevant throughout the life cycle.  The dynamic 
nature of each insurgency allows for separate paths within and between each stage.  Each 
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of the stages can be driven or shaped by the goals (political or armed conflict) set by the 
insurgent leadership.   
1. Preinsurgency Stage 
The preinsurgency stage can be understood as the planning and organizing stage.  
During this stage, the detection of an insurgency is difficult to determine because the 
activities of a relatively small group are conducted underground.  If actions are performed 
in the open during this stage, it is minor in scope and usually dismissed by the 
government as nonviolent if annoying political activity by a minority group or faction.  
As noted by the United States Army’s “Counterinsurgency” manual (FM 3-24), “One 
common feature of insurgencies is that the government that is being targeted generally 
takes a while to recognize that an insurgency is occurring.  Insurgents take advantage of 
this time to build strength and gather support.”78  The assumption here is that the 
insurgency, assuming that there is to be one, is most vulnerable at this stage and can be 
“nipped in the bud” by arrests, repression or passing reforms that remove the 
accumulating grievances. In practice, however, arrests and repression often fall on the 
wrong groups thus eliminating indigenous competition for true radicals. Reforms cannot 
be passed because they would undermine the primacy of the ruling group(s), or 
governments simply do not want to admit that there is a problem, allowing radicals to 
build their base.  
Throughout this stage, the leadership of the insurgency is emerging; the group is 
forming their identity and publicizing grievances that it hopes will resonate with the 
targeted population.  Recruitment, training, and amassing supplies and arms may also 
occur during this stage assuming that the insurgents are competent, have the resources 
and access to outside support, and a long term strategy for success, as opposed to 
optimistic assumptions that a few bold acts will spark a spontaneous popular uprising, as 
was the case in Algeria in 1954.  The rallying of support for the movement can be based 
on historical, economic, political, or societal conditions that may enflame discontent 
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among a portion of the population.79  Some of society’s intellectuals may also become 
articulate and influential advocates for their cause at home and abroad, thus helping to 
legitimate it.80   
An insurgent organization may seek further to legitimate itself associating its 
cause with historical events that have been memorialized in the public mind and 
bequeathed a legacy of injustice or unfinished business such as an uprising, a government 
massacre of a group, or a war of independence, and so on. Associating the revolutionary 
movement with historical figures who have achieved mythological status—Túpac Amaru, 
Simon Bolivar, Abd el-Kader, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, even eventually Che Guevara, some 
religious figure or national martyr, the list goes on—is also pretty standard.  
Revolutionary acts emulating the tradition of these great men is offered by the 
revolutionaries as the only remedy to current tribulations, which allows the insurgency to 
gain a following.  Regional conflict, particularly when in areas of border disputes or 
where aggrieved refugees exist in significant numbers, can become an enabling condition 
for insurgencies. A pool of young, unemployed males (typically 15 to 25 years old) who 
are unable to marry and face a hopeless future provides a pool of potential recruits for the 
movement.81  As noted by Jean Piaget, the life cycle of adolescence divides into distinct 
psychological stages during which one may be vulnerable to insurgent propaganda that 
offers plans for world or at least national or group salvation, which could contain 
messianic ideas that may even slither over into megalomania.82  At this stage in the 
process, discontented groups may arm themselves and establish a safe haven.  Insurgents 
typically occupy remote, inhospitable area where government forces are thin on the 
ground.  Jungles, forests, mountains, deserts or swamps can give insurgents better 
freedom of movement, a place to hide, as well as bases to train and organize.  Regions 
with porous borders and dense urban areas may also offer sanctuaries.83   
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Of course, these conditions may be necessary but insufficient for insurgency.  It 
also suggests that this “model” explanation requires more than a touch of paranoia and 
institutionally induced intelligence for pre-insurgent conditions. But government actions 
may help to turn some disadvantaged groups into insurrectionary ones by their policies, 
or simply by neglect.  In this way, a sector of the population may unite against a non-
representative government on the basis of group identity provided by religion, class, 
ideology, region, ethnicity, or tribe. The out-group(s), unable to pursue their agendas 
within the political, economic or social system, becomes a recruiting pool for insurgents 
and further popularizes and legitimizes the idea of armed conflict.  Additionally, the 
government’s inability to provide basic services to its populace (security, justice, health 
care, education, utilities, or transportation) weakens state legitimacy and strengthens sub-
national loyalties.  Corruption at all levels feeds disgust with the established order. Again, 
it must be emphasized that these conditions exist in many countries where revolution is 
absent. But where these conditions do exist, insurgency may be triggered by a natural 
disaster, an economic crisis, by political assassinations and disappearances, or fiercely 
disputed elections that incite political and societal turmoil.84   
The grievances that unite the insurgent group and help promote a group identity 
are publicized during what the CIA calls the “pre-insurgency” phase85 to build a support 
base.  The grievances must be communicated well enough to the broader population in 
order to gain and eventually justify violent actions and to build and retain legitimacy.  
Propaganda is crucial to the unity and expansion of the group during this stage.  Today, 
websites and DVDs figure prominently in this endeavor. In the era of Batista and 
Somoza, that is the 1950s and 1960s, methods would have included pamphlets and flyers, 
clandestine radio stations to broadcast propaganda and revolutionary anthems, village 
meetings which could turn into popular courts to try or shame malefactors and establish 
revolutionary authority, the formation of groups in universities, factories or rural estates 
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to protest injustices real or imagined, bring attention to all the grievances of the 
organization and help further unite the movement. Legitimate social and political 
organizations, demonstrations and protests, along with media exposes can provide 
another forum to publicize grievances to the local population as well as to the national 
and international community.  The problem for the government, its supporters, and 
international partners, is to determine when legitimate democratic activity becomes 
subversion? Because the bar was set pretty low during the cold war or even before in 
Latin American societies divided often bitterly along class and/or racial lines, repression 
inevitably was offered as proof by the revolutionaries of the government’s flaunting of 
democratic values and international human rights standards. This in turn helps to solidify 
group identity, which relies on cohesion through grievances and the creation of an “us 
versus them” mentality.86  According to Chalmers Johnson, “What it [insurgency] needs 
is a general ideological appeal that will bring the revolutionary party the support of the 
people at the same time that it disguises any elements of the party’s ultimate aspirations 
that might conflict with the demands of the mass movement.”87  The propaganda used 
during this phase also takes advantage of the cultural, religious, language, or ethnic 
symbols that set the group apart from the opposition and the nation.  The use of books, 
movies, and music to further the cause is used plausibly to delegitimize the government 
as foreigners, occupiers, and instruments of outside or elite interests.88   
Recruitment, training, and the accumulation of arms, cash, and supplies is also 
important in this stage. A sudden disappearance of substantial numbers of a particular 
demographic in the population, specifically the young men, may be an indicator of 
subversive activity.  Suspicion or rumors in the populace about arms, insurgent aims and 
activities, and insurgent training locations may characterize this phase.  Also during this 
phase, recruits and insurgent members might receive training assistance or at least 
tolerance from a sympathetic outside country, or one unable or unwilling to challenge 
insurgent occupation of a portion of its territory.  The insurgent group may likewise build 
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up their arms and supplies with the help of sympathetic countries and participate in 
criminal moneymaking initiatives, such as robberies, kidnapping for ransom, drug trade, 
or protection rackets, to aid this endeavor.  The group typically steals weapons, 
equipment, or uniforms through attacks on military or police bases.  During this stage, the 
newly formed insurgent group is still disorganized and weak.89   
Adding to the vulnerability of this stage for the insurgent group is the potential 
government reaction.  As noted by the CIA “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012”: 
“The government’s reaction in this and the next stage is perhaps the most important 
determinant of whether a movement will develop into an insurgency.”90  Government 
countermeasures to throw the young insurgent group off balance could stunt any 
momentum and even knock it off track.  An effective counterattack by the government at 
this stage of the “process” might consist of a publicity campaign that reinforces 
patriotism and national identity, but which runs the risk of excluding the target group by 
branding them as “unpatriotic” and hence fair game for government-organized retaliation 
through arrests, deportations or incarceration on the basis of “special” measures and 
decrees.  Or it may encourage sectarian or ethnic strife to keep its hands clean.  It can also 
accentuate the shared history, traditions, and culture of the predominate group to 
encourage a “divide-and-rule” approach to further induce mutual suspicion within a 
multi-ethnic or multi-denominational population and create rifts within the early-stage 
insurgent group or isolate their natural support base by stigmatizing them. 
Alternatively, the government could address public grievances through legal, 
political, or economic reforms and work with moderate opposition to resolve injustices. 
Alas, this enlightened approach seldom happens because those who support the 
government have a vested interest in preserving the status quo upon which their power is 
based. In fact, it takes a very self-confident and institutionally solid society with a strong 
sense of justice to recognize inequalities and move to alleviate them within the 
framework of established democratic practice and political institutions. That this proved 
impossible for France in Algeria between 1945 and 1962, the British in Malaya, Kenya 
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and even Northern Ireland in the 1940s–1980s, and challenged and continues to challenge 
even the United States during the civil rights movement of the 1960s, serves to underline 
the difficulties of pre-emptive reform in cold war Latin America. For this reason, the 
natural reaction of governments was to resort to a crack down by security forces on 
political dissent.  However, to be successful, repression should be carefully calibrated to 
achieve its goals. Repression may merely achieve a short-term success if it attacks the 
symptom and not the disease. However, it also risks reinforcing insurgent efforts by 
proving their case and further creating martyrs to their cause.  For instance, if security 
forces use extrajudicial methods (unlawful detentions or death squads) and 
indiscriminately target members (including moderates), it could reinforce the notion that 
they are under siege and should rebel before the situation becomes worse. 91 Police forces 
that maintain voluminous files on prominent political dissenters, move to arrest them, 
thus eliminating the competition for the true revolutionaries of whose presence the police 
may be entirely ignorant. This was the case in Algeria in the 1950s, when arrests by 
French police of moderate Algerian nationalists cleared away the in-house competition 
for the radical Front de Libération Nationale.    
2. Incipient Conflict Stage 
The insurgent group initiates the incipient conflict stage when they begin violent 
overt operations mixed with intimidation.  They may chose to use well-calculated 
asymmetric and terrorist tactics such as assassinations, kidnappings, small bombings, 
night letters, the levying of “taxes,” enforcement of “revolutionary” behavior and 
“justice,” and so on.92  The insurgent’s use of terror is aimed at convincing the populace 
that the government is unable to protect them against violence, thus causing some of the 
people in certain offended areas to transfer their support to the guerrillas for their own 
wellbeing.93  Governments often lay the blame for the increase in violent activity on to 
criminals or bandits and may refuse, publicly at least, to acknowledge that they face an 
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organizing conspiracy.  This stage is the most vulnerable one for the insurgents because 
they have revealed their existence through initial attacks while they are still building their 
forces, support base, and remain relatively weak.  During this phase, the insurgent group 
needs to balance the need to rally supporters, publicize its cause, and establish its 
viability and potential for success in the public mind. It becomes an added bonus if, 
through their attacks, they provoke a government overreaction which falls 
indiscriminately on the population, which will henceforth conclude that the government 
is not their ally and protector.  Analyzing the actions of both the insurgent group and the 
government throughout this stage may determine whether the insurrection will flourish or 
perish in the long run.94    
Insurgent leadership is developed during this phase and could provide insight to 
the insurgencies’ goals.  Understanding the leader’s goals, motivations, and previous 
experience (such as military training or political acumen) can be very revealing.  
Comprehending the leader’s expectations for the insurgency’s end game, and the likely 
tactic to reach it, can also help governments to act appropriately.  “An ideal insurgent 
leader displays charisma, the flexibility to balance ideology with the need to be inclusive 
and leverage local grievances, and an ability to engender loyalty and maintain group 
unity.”95  Popular support or at least neutrality may count among the most important 
aspects for the insurgent’s survivability, although insurgencies seldom win because the 
majority of the population supports them.   
The civilian population is critical for the insurgency as it provides, willingly or 
unwillingly, food, shelter, medicine, funds, intelligence, recruits, and so on.  In the same 
manner, supporters can help insurgents by not providing, or providing false intelligence, 
to the government security forces to protect the movement.  Indicators of popular support 
can reveal whether the insurgent group is growing or withering.  More recently, the use 
of the Internet can provide a good source of support and coordination—“virtual support.”  
In this phase, the insurgent group must maintain a logistical system that can support their 
overt operations.  This can be done through theft or capture of security force’s stocks, 
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purchasing of weapons and materials on the black market, or by external assistance 
(transnational terrorist and/or criminal organizations or state sponsors).96   
The government’s actions, as previously mentioned, are a critical element during 
the incipient conflict stage.  The government’s willingness to recognize and act in a 
timely manner against the insurgency can prevent the conflict from intensifying.  Much 
like the insurgency, the government’s actions must be well calculated to prevent the loss 
of popular support.  As the CIA posits, “The willingness and ability of government 
leaders to act decisively, authoritatively, and to compel all elements of stage power—
security, economic, social, and political—to work toward a common purpose are the 
clearest signs of effective government leadership.”97  A major instrument used by the 
government to defeat the insurgency are its security forces—military, police, and 
intelligence.  It is extremely important for the government that the security forces units be 
highly trained, tactically proficient, and well disciplined.  It is also paramount, although 
seldom the case, that small tactical units be deployed with strong leadership that contain a 
healthy appreciation for human rights.  Small tactical units can support counterinsurgency 
operations by using discriminate force and firepower so as to prevent driving the 
population to the insurgent camp.  This small government footprint can only survive with 
a strong network of intelligence that can be effectively disseminated across agencies to 
ensure unity of effort.  All actions against the insurgency must also be confined within 
the framework of the existing legal system in order to preserve state legitimacy.98  The 
problem is that the legal system becomes more “flexible” in response to the “state of 
emergency” by introducing martial law, “special acts,” or “orders in council” to allow 
extra-judicial methods. 
Another way of growing or maintaining legitimacy is through external support.  
External support for the government can be critical to its counterinsurgency efforts.  The 
government must maintain strong support from the international community, especially 
from its neighbors so as better to isolate its internal enemies.  This coalition of support 
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can prevent or at least reduce the flow of funds, supplies, and recruits to the insurgent 
group, diminish the potential for insurgent sanctuary, and reinforce the government’s 
legitimacy on the international stage.  Furthermore, government partners and allies may 
provide training, intelligence, combat troops, advisers, and weapons.99   
3. Open Insurgency Stage 
As posited by Peter Paret, military historian and World War II veteran, open 
insurgent warfare begins after the conquest of at least a portion of the population.  These 
conquests, he explained, are completed after enough of the populace in a particular area 
has been educated, intimidated, and organized for the support of the revolution.  Paret 
goes on to state that insurgents advance to this stage when conditions are “unfavorable to 
the enemy, even though his military forces may be larger and, according to traditional 
standards, better trained and equipped than those of the insurgents.”100 
As plainly indicated by the name, in the open insurgency stage, the government 
has not simply acknowledged that there is an insurgency but is battling attempts by the 
insurgency to exert control increasingly expanded swaths of territory.  Attacks between 
the military and insurgents escalate in scope, violence, frequency, and sophistication.  If 
external support exists for the insurgents, it now becomes more evident.  Insurgents will 
progress from destabilization state authority to dislodging it from power.  They may 
establish an area of control where they have driven government representatives out and 
have established a “shadow government” in preparation to remove the incumbent.  The 
insurgent group seeks to increase sympathizers in the government, persuade government 
officials to defect, establish administrative services of their own (education, health care, 
courts, etc.), and be recognized as legitimate by the international community.101  The 
goal of the “shadow government” is to promote unity and maximum involvement in the 
movement by all groups.  Chalmers Johnson explains that “As the bases are expanded 
and consolidated, they become a regular guerrilla ‘infrastructure,’ or an ‘alternate 
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government,’ supplying the rebel forces with food, sanctuary, training centers, and 
manpower.  Such enclaves also weaken the existing regime by removing land and 
population from its control.”102 
During this stage, military operations on both sides continue to be critical to the 
outcome.  Insurgents acts that are outside the accepted norms of behavior to incite 
violence, “sow disorder, intimidate the population, weaken the government [and its 
agencies], and create government repression.”103  Insurgent forces are conducting more 
coordinated attacks by the use of “terrorism and guerrilla warfare tactics, including hit-
and-run raids on military and police units, ambushes, assassinations, improvised 
explosive device (IED) assaults, and attacks on infrastructure and symbols of government 
authority such as schools, hospitals, utilities, cell phone towers, and bridges.”104  Often 
the insurgent fighters avoid prolonged battles with government military forces because of 
the firepower advantage they have.  On the other hand, the government’s most important 
task during this phase is to reestablish control and security in areas of insurgent control.  
The security forces aim to provide the populace with security from insurgent intimidation 
and reprisal.  If this does not occur, the people are less likely to support the government.  
The government may choose to deploy its forces in fulfillment of three different 
strategies.  As defined by the CIA, the approaches are: 
1. Enemy-centric approach:  Aimed at the destruction of insurgent 
fighters and infrastructure through the use of search-and-destroy 
and cordon-and-search tactics.   
2. Population-centric approach:  Aimed at strengthening support for 
the government, securing the population, and search and destroy 
the insurgence as a secondary goal.  The tactic behind this 
approach is to clear-hold-build, where security forces clear 
insurgents out, maintain security in that area, establish projects that 
increase support for the government, and empower the populace in 
order to maintain their own security against insurgents.   
3. Authoritarian approach:  Aimed at punishing both the insurgents 
and the population that supports them.  This method could be 
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counterproductive because it negates respect for human rights, 
winning popular support, and it promotes the overuse of force.  
Authoritarian governments, unconcerned with international support 
for their cause, are more likely to employ this tactic.105   
The decision to use one of these approaches is based on the country’s historical 
experience (form of government, culture, military capability or the character of the 
insurgency).106     
As the assistance for the insurgency from external supporters might become more 
evident in this phase, foreign actors will more likely openly display their support.  
External support could bolster the political or military endeavors of the recipient through 
diplomatic, financial, equipment, sanctuary, intelligence, training, advisers, arms and 
nonlethal assistance.  The alliance created with an external entity may have a shared 
purpose, but may also have interests that diverge.  This support may provide the 
legitimacy required to further their cause, or it may backfire and make the government or 
the insurgents appear as a puppet of a foreign interest.  In any case, the “external patron, 
in accordance with its own interests, may limit the type, scope, or location of attacks; 
attempt to change the nature of the conflict; or seek to prevent its client from winning, 
wishing instead to prolong the conflict indefinitely.”107 
4. Resolution Stage 
The resolution stage is the final stage of the insurgent life cycle.  By this point, the 
insurgency should have progressed through the previous stages and might have even 
regressed several times before arriving at the end.  Putting aside the lengths of the 
insurgency life cycle, it is inferred that each insurgency will conclude with either an 
insurgent victory, a negotiated settlement, or a government victory. Alternatively, a 
conflict may drag on indefinitely, as is the case of the FARC in Colombia, which has 
been in the field with fluctuating fortunes since the 1950s.   
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Insurgent victory is the only conclusive outcome that has an unambiguous result.  
The insurgents take control of the government, eject foreign occupiers, or gain 
independence for a region.  This outcome can also spark further insurgencies by the 
regime’s followers or groups excluded or disappointed by the new government.  The 
insurgent victory may have been promoted by the withdrawal of domestic support from 
critical segments of the populace, such as the elites.  Insurgents could also unite anti-
government opposition and create a stronger support base for their movement.  This, in 
turn, might expedite the government’s willingness to seek a resolution through 
negotiations.  Other markers of insurgent victory are the withdrawal of support for the 
state from critical foreign allies, increased pressure from those allies to reform 
government policies to address insurgent criticisms, or increased support to insurgents.  
The weakening of the state’s economy, the departure of multinational corporations, 
reports of military plots or coups, massive desertions, defection, or surrender or defeat of 
security forces are also signs of insurgent victory during the resolution stage.108   
The second outcome that may transpire from the resolutions stage is a negotiation 
settlement.  In this case, the resolution stage can become fragile if spoilers attempt to 
destabilize peace talks.  Several false starts and delays of implementation typically occur 
during negotiation settlements.  The possible differences in ideology within an 
insurgency could lead to renewed violence.  Splinting among the insurgent group’s 
members could be based on the perceptions that the government is attempting to betray 
the movement or a general disagreement about the terms of settlement exists.  
Insurgencies may be fragmented by geography, faction, or ideological vision, so that 
achieving unity in the post-war phase may provoke internecine turf wars. This type of 
turmoil can occur for years after an official end to the fighting has occurred.  A 
negotiation settlement attempt could be a technique used by belligerents to buy time and 
regroup after setbacks.  An insurgent group is likely to negotiate in good faith and reach a 
compromise when they have experienced battlefield triumphs—momentarily giving them 
the upper-hand—but perceive overall military victory as improbable.  As stated by the 
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CIA, “Neither party wants to negotiate from a position of weakness, and a belligerent on 
the decline may seek a symbolic victory to improve its bargaining position.”109 
Indicators that a sincere negotiation settlement could take place are in evidence 
when both sides deem that military victory is out of reach or insurgents believe they have 
a better chance of achieving their goals through a democratic political process.  Likewise, 
a change in the government’s political leadership may promote positive negotiations.  A 
third-party mediator, viewed as legitimate by both sides, can also help in the negotiation 
process by proposing acceptable conditions while monitoring a cease-fire.  Lastly, 
another external factor that can promote negotiations is the evidence that foreign allies 
are withdrawing support or are pressing the government or insurgent group to 
negotiate.110   
The third outcome that may occur during the resolution stage is a government 
victory.  Much like the potential result of an insurgent victory, a government victory can 
tend to be a protracted process.  A government victory will be evident when insurgents 
reduce their violent activities, lose popular support, are driven into remote sanctuaries in-
country or abroad, and external assistance is cut-off.  Although insurgent strength is 
significantly reduced, low-level violence can persist for years, particularly if insurgents 
turn to criminal activities (drug trafficking or resource plunder).  Outside of insurgent 
actions, a government victory can be evident when the populace’s daily lives return to 
normal, government services run uninterrupted, and security forces provide safety to 
citizens.  The overall umbrella of security will also improve the confidence of the 
government’s economic system, lead refugees or displaced citizens to return home, mend 
relationships between civilians and security forces (improving intelligence against 
insurgents), and allow for military units to return to base.111 
With a basic understanding of the revolutionary anatomy through both theories 
and progressionary stages, this thesis will pursue a more detailed historical analysis of the 
Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions in the following chapters.  The prominent theories 
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identified in this chapter will additionally allow for a deeper appreciation and 
comprehension of overall reasons for the inception of these revolutions.  The basic 
insurgent life cycle, provided by the CIA, laid a foundational overview to better 
understand progression and regression of these two successful revolutions.  Before diving 
into a deeper analysis of the critical factors contributing to the success of the Cuban and 
Nicaraguan Revolution, the following chapter will provide a historical background in 




Before focusing on the particulars that led to the success of the Cuban and 
Nicaraguan revolutions, and allowing for a better grasp in terms of theory and life cycle 
covered in Chapter II, a thorough understanding of the permissive environment that 
allowed for these insurgencies to take root is required.  This chapter will provide the 
historical background on both Cuba and Nicaragua in order to lay the foundations for 
which further examination can be accomplished.  Specifically, it will cover the rise of 
both Fulgencio Batista in Cuba and the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua.  Additionally, it 
will explain how Fidel Castro’s M-26-7 in Cuba and Carlos Fonseca’s (among others) 
FSLN in Nicaragua developed and rose to power.   
 
Figure 2.  Map of Cuba112 
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A. BATISTA’S REIGN  
Fulgencio Batista was born in Oriente province, Cuba on January 16, 1901.  Both 
of his parents worked on sugar plantation fields and lived a humble life as part of the 
lower order of Cuban society.  He lived in a two-room home with no indoor plumbing or 
access to safe drinking water. He left home at an early age and joined the army in 1921, 
which became the vehicle for his meteoric and improbable rise in Cuba.  While those in 
his home village remembered the young Batista as simpatico, personable, and charming 
with a sharpened intuition, his military peers saw him differently: while an efficient 
soldier, Batista also proved to be opportunistic, cunning, devious and willing to sacrifice 
his erstwhile friends and allies if it proved to be to his advantage.  Starting out as an 
ordinary infantry soldier, he managed to become a custodian in President Alfredo de 
Zayas estate by 1923, which gave him access to Cuba’s elite. As Batista biographer Justo 
Carrillo explains, “Batista recognized no ethical standards of conduct; he travelled 
through life with no moral compass whatsoever.” 113   
This meant that Batista had a natural ability to play both sides of Cuba’s 
tumultuous internal politics of the 1920s and 1930s. As an example of this, while he 
participated in events praising President Gerardo Machado, he managed to distance 
himself from the less popular policies that characterized Machado’s rule such as the 
heavy-handed practices used to deal with his opposition.  Batista’s ability to play the 
“middle ground” during Machado’s regime proved pivotal to his rise.  Machado ran for 
president in 1924 with the promise of eliminating the controversial 1901 Platt 
Amendment, integrated into the 1903 treaty between Washington and Havana, which 
gave the United States inordinate influence in Cuban domestic and foreign policy as well 
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as a base at Guantanamo Bay.114  Not only did Machado fail to reestablish U.S.-Cuban 
relations on a more equitable basis, but also he amended the constitution so he could run 
for a second presidential term (extending his presidency from 4 to 8 years).  During this 
second term, the mistrust among Cuban citizens for Machado’s corrupt regime—tied to 
the economic downturn of the Great Depression—raised discontent, which led Machado 
to become increasingly repressive and declaring martial law throughout the island.  
Under these conditions, several revolutionary groups appeared, including communist 
influenced groups.  As military courts tried these revolutionaries, Batista conveniently 
managed to be the stenographer for the trials while at the same time secretly becoming a 
member of one of the very anti-Machado groups on trial—the ABC Revolutionary 
Society.115 
As violence and disorder in Cuba reached a boiling point, in 1933 Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s administration invoked the Platt Amendment to topple Machado in a 
bloodless U.S. sponsored coup.116  Machado fled into exile on August 12, 1933, and was 
replaced by Carlos Manuel de Cespedes (provisional president between August 12 to 
September 5).  President Cespedes assigned General Armando Montes (a retired military 
officer) to be his chief of staff.  General Montes was disliked among the military, 
particularly by politically active NCOs, for reducing enlisted billets and salaries.  On 
September 3, 1933, a group of sergeants, corporals, and soldiers formed a committee they 
named the “Junta de los Ocho,” or Committee of Eight.  Batista led this group with the 
intention of meeting the enlisted corps’ demands: “for no reduction of salaries; for the 
right to use leather leggings and flat caps like those of the officers; for no reduction in the 
number of enlisted personnel; for the abolition of assignments as aides to officers,” 
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among other demands.  Batista was quoted as saying “We aren’t going against anyone.  
For now, we are going to take care of ourselves, and later we’ll see.”117   
In the politically charged atmosphere of the 1930s in which the military played an 
active role, Batista continued to hone his abilities to straddle the line between solider and 
intuitive politician.  Already affirmed as leader of the Junta de los Ocho, Batista also 
became a member of the Agrupacion Revolucionario de Cuba (ARC)—an anti-Cespedes 
group.  On September 4, 1933, Sergeant Batista led a revolt, known as the Sergeants’ 
revolt, in response to further rumors of reducing the size of the military, decreasing 
military pay, and plans to repeal the law that allowed sergeants to become officers—a 
promotion through the ranks at odds with Cuba’s class based social structure.  While the 
Sergeants’ revolt was intended to mitigate internal armed forces issues, the success of the 
revolt and Batista’s opportunistic actions gained the attention of politicians that later used 
it for political gain—turning Batista’s Sergeants’ revolt to a full-blown coup and 
replacing President Cespedes.118  Following the September 4 coup, a self-proclaimed 
(unelected) government under the name of Pentarquia (government of five leaders), with 
the support of politicians, was established.  The Pentarquia seized power from September 
5 to September 10, until Ramon Grau became president.  Sergeant Batista was recognized 
as “the outstanding revolutionary of 1933.”  He was promoted from sergeant to colonel 
overnight and became the Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army—ending the reign of elite 
officers in the prestigious position and establishing Batista among the most powerful and 
influential men in Cuba.119   
Colonel Batista gained popularity through the implementation of a rural education 
program, which at the time was among the pro-peasant reforms delegated to the military 
to accomplish.  He also gained popular support by helping during the transition of the 
democratic election of President Miquel Mariano Gomez in 1936 (first free presidential 
election in more than 11 years).  Political science professor and author Anthony James 
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Joes posited, “As head of the army, Batista was in effect co-president with Gomez.”120  
With Batista holding the real power, the same was said about the subsequent President—
Federico Laredo Bru (1936–1940).  Batista even contributed to the legalization of the 
Cuban Communist party in 1938.  At the height of his popularity, Colonel Batista ran for 
president in 1940 and won through the overwhelming support of ex-Machadistas and the 
Cuban Communist Party.  Batista’s presidency was viewed as progressive and brought 
economic and political stability to the island.121  With the constitutional restraint of not 
being able to succeed himself in the presidential election of 1944 (restored after President 
Machado’s manipulation to stay in power), “Batista [won] widespread praise for his 
conduct in holding fair elections” and not attempting to maintain power.122  While the 
two elections following Batista’s time as president (1940–1944) were among the most 
legitimate and democratic seen to-date in Cuba, the popularity and trust of the citizens 
towards the government began to dwindle.  The Cuban population became increasingly 
disenchanted with politicians and public institutions.  A common sentiment among the 
Cuban people for President Ramon Grau San Martin (1944–1948) and Carlos Prio 
Socarras (1948–1952) was summed up in one word—vendepatrias (selling out of the 
homeland).  Both presidents were seen as easily influenced by foreign interests, which 
contributed to the lack of respect from most citizens.  Adding to the mistrust, both 
administrations were viewed as incompetent and extremely corrupt.123   
While Cuba was not experiencing an economic downturn (typically present before 
a military coup), the political division and discontent had reached a climax—generating a 
political crisis.  In 1952, Batista capitalized on widespread public discontent with 
government corruption to execute a military coup.  It is also important to note that before 
Batista conducted his military coup, he was running a distant third with a small 
percentage of support from the population and was projected to lose in the presidential 
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elections of June 1952.124  However, once he seized power illegally, the Cuban people 
seemed to greet this momentary respite from politics with relief and gave him the benefit 
of the doubt.  Subsequently, when Colonel Batista ran for president again in 1954, he 
won without serious opposition.  But according to Anthony Joes, when Cuba, under 
President Batista, became a “full-time extortion racket,” residual support quickly 
eroded.125  When Batista’s grip on power was increasingly threatened, much like his 
predecessors, he resorted to “a regime of repression characterized by states of siege, 
censorship, closing of universities, arbitrary arrests, and selective assassinations.”126  His 
oppressive nature of governance culminated in opposition groups, such as the one led by 
Fidel Castro, gaining more popularity and momentum against his regime.  From 1957 to 
1958, the resistance groups reached their climax when the National Directorate was 
established—uniting guerrilla groups under Castro’s command.127 
B. M-26-7’S DEVELOPMENT AND RISE TO POWER 
Before Batista’s military coup of June 1952, a young Fidel Castro was an 
ambitious lawyer, member of the ortodoxo party, and the leading Congressional 
candidate in the Havana district.  Castro was born August 13, 1926, in the town of Biran, 
Oriente province.  His father was a Spanish immigrant who worked his way from being a 
peddler, selling lemonade to sugar workers, to eventually owning or permanently renting 
approximately 26,000 acres.  Roughly 300 families, mostly Haitian cane cutters, worked 
for the Castro family and sold their sugarcane to the United Fruit Company.  Fidel 
Castro’s mother, in fact, was his father’s second wife and worked as a maid or cook in 
the household before their marriage.  She was at least 25 years younger than her husband 
and was illiterate until adulthood.  Castro was placed in the best schools from a young 
age.  He attended a Jesuit-run private school as a young boy and later entered Belen 
College—a highly respected preparatory school.  After graduating from Belen College, 
he attended Havana University’s School of Law and graduated in 1950.  Like the 
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majority of wealthy Cubans at the time, he was influenced by the intense political activity 
on campus and became a leading participant in political groups.  On campus, the political 
intensity reached such levels that student activists carried guns due to the habitual 
“physical intimidation, beatings, and assassinations [that] occurred.”128  By 1952, 
Castro’s political ambitions reached their height as a practicing lawyer in Havana.  His 
disdain for the political leaders, particularly presidents Grau and Prio, influenced him to 
run for a Senate seat.  Batista’s coup further outraged the young Castro by shattering his 
dreams of political office, which lead him to present a legal brief to the Court of Appeals 
in Havana to remove Batista from office, which the court rejected.  Having exhausted his 
legal challenges, Castro became a leading proponent for armed insurrection.129   
On July 26, 1953 (a date that will brand his resistance group), Castro, along with 
an estimated 165 supporters, attacked the Moncada Barracks the second largest army 
base in the Oriente Province city of Santiago.  It proved to be a serious miscalculation as 
the ill-trained and under equipped Castro forces were crushed by approximately 1,000 
troops.  Castro and the surviving members of his group were sentenced to jail in a 
minimum-security prison on the Isle of Pines.  He documented his court-martial 
experiences in a clandestinely circulated pamphlet named History Will Absolve Me.130  In 
an effort to gain popularity, Batista declared general amnesty for the political prisoners in 
May 1955, after only one year and seven months of imprisonment.131  After their release, 
Castro and several of his supporters fled to Mexico where they reorganized under the 
name of the 26th of July movement (Movimiento 26 de Julio, M-26-7).  They trained in 
guerrilla warfare and continued to gain support through anti-Batista rhetoric.  According 
to James DeFronzo, “Castro traveled to the United States and addressed anti-Batista 
Cuban exiles in New York and Florida.  He raised thousands of dollars for the purchase 
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of weapons, supplies, and [a] wooden, hurricane-damaged thirty-eight-foot yacht, the 
Granma, to transport his revolutionaries to Cuba.”132 
Fueled by his growing anti-Batista passion and confidence from the irregular 
warfare training he received in Mexico, Castro formulated a second plan to liberate Cuba 
from Batista’s dictatorship.  The date of the attack was set for November 30, 1956.  M-
26-7’s strategy was for Castro’s forces to conduct an amphibious assault from Mexico 
combined with a simultaneous revolt within the city of Santiago—the second largest city 
in Cuba.133  Castro’s second attack against Batista was a dreadful failure.  His supporters 
onboard Granma were poorly equipped for the mechanical problems plaguing the old 
vessel and the rough seas, which resulted in a majority of the revolutionaries becoming 
seasick.  Ernesto “Che” Guevara, the onboard medical doctor and future romanticized 
revolutionary, described the failed voyage, “We began a frenzied search for the anti-
seasickness pills, which we did not find... The entire boat took on an aspect of both 
ridiculous and tragic: men with anguished faces holding their stomachs, some with their 
heads in buckets, others lying in the strangest positions, immobile.”134   
Adding to the already deteriorating conditions, the Granma arrived on December 
2, 1956, two days late and in the wrong location.  Castro’s 82 men wandered for three 
days before a peasant who led Batista’s army to them betrayed them.  His revolutionary 
force was captured, killed, or dispersed, rendering them unfit for direct combat against 
Batista’s army.  Fifteen survivors fled into the Sierra Maestra Mountains in eastern 
Cuba—a move that proved important to their future success.135   
 Not only did the Sierra Maestra Mountains offer Castro’s forces the terrain to 
hide from Batista’s army, but linked-up with a well-established network of squatters 
(guajiros) who eventually provided the fighting and support network necessary to 
survive.  The well-organized squatter army, led by Crescencio Perez, had a unifying 
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grievance—mistreatment by the Cuban army who, at the behest of the landlords, had run 
them off the land.  According to Timothy Wickham-Crowley, the squatter army 
numbered around 50,000 strong and had created a pact with Castro in mid-1956 (months 
before the failed invasion).136  Batista’s failure to take either the squatter army or Castro 
as a serious threat also allowed the battered rebels to regroup and gain strength.   
Shortly after the Cuban army had significantly weakened Castro’s forces in 
December 1956, Batista had announced that Fidel Castro had been killed during his failed 
landing.  Castro masterfully utilized the New York Times to prove to the Cuban people 
and the international community that he was alive and “fully operating” in the Sierra 
Maestras.  Not only did he prove Batista wrong on an international stage, but also he 
pretended to have more trained rebel troops at his disposal than he truly did.137   
To Castro’s advantage, many other, mostly urban, anti-Batista groups distracted 
the Cuban army.  Batista’s strategy of dedicating most of his forces to the urban 
insurgents proved to be a grave miscalculation, which allowed Castro’s forces to regroup 
in a “liberated zone” and gain peasant support.  While Castro was regrouping in the 
mountains, urban guerrillas were more powerful and effective against Batista’s forces.  In 
March 1957, one such group, the Revolutionary Directorate (Directorio Revolucionario, 
DR), almost reached their goal of toppling Batista.  Batista narrowly escaped the DR’s 
attack on the National Palace in Havana when the guerrillas fought their way to his 
headquarters on the third-floor.  The urban guerrillas’ attacks not only gave Castro ample 
time to regroup, but also the bloody suppression by the regime was more visible to a 
majority of the populace who lived in the cities.  This promoted the support for the 
revolution and increased the likelihood of radicalization in Cuban society.138  
Concurrently, Batista’s armed forces became increasingly demoralized by Batista’s 
strategic focus on Cuba’s cities, the brutality of the war against the population, and by 
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their lack of proper counterinsurgency training.  Under Batista’s rule, the Cuban army 
became a corrupt, unprofessional, and demoralized force unable to face any domestic or 
international threat.139   
In May 1958, in a last-ditch effort to gain ground against the M-26-7, Batista 
launched a final offensive.  Understanding the importance of showing the Cuban populace 
and international community that the Sierra Maestra’s insurgent’s days were numbered, he 
ordered his armed forces to spare nothing in order to destroy Castro’s forces.  
Unfortunately for Batista, his army was too weak to confront the growing insurgent force 
and the offensive culminated in the realization that he had lost control and support in much 
of the Oriente region.  The Army never returned to the Sierra Maestra Mountains. Instead, 
Batista continued his focus on the cities.140  With the failure of Batista’s final offensive 
against the M-26-7 in May 1958, military morale hit rock bottom.141   
 The M-26-7 further solidified their organization through a National Directorate, 
which united both the rural and urban guerrillas, in 1958.  With Castro as their leader, the 
group focused on the goal of ousting the Batista regime.  This was a significant turning 
point for the movement because as it added middle- and even upper-class supporters to its 
ranks.  From 1957 to 1958, Batista amplified his repression, which resulted in popular 
outrage and increased support for Castro’s movement across the political spectrum.  
Simultaneously, the United States, the regional hegemon, publicly condemned the Batista 
government and established an arms embargo against his regime.142   
A combination of the withdrawal of U.S. support for the regime, recent defeats at 
the hands of Castro’s rural guerrillas, and low morale made the Cuban army effectively 
dysfunctional.  With the M-26-7’s victory over Batista’s weakened forces in the summer 
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of 1958, the regime began to unravel, especially after Guevara’s guerrilla forces overran 
a large garrison in Santiago and met little resistance as the M-26-7 marched on Havana to 
seal their victory.  By January 1959, Batista had fled the country and Fidel Castro seized 
power in Cuba with the overwhelming enthusiasm of the Cuban populace. 143   
 
Figure 3.  Map of Nicaragua144 
C. SOMOZA’S REIGN  
Anastasio Somoza Garcia, the initiator of the Somoza family reign in Nicaragua, 
was born February 1, 1896 in San Marcos, Nicaragua.  Somoza Sr., nicknamed “Tacho,” 
was the son of a wealthy coffee plantation owner and educated in the United States.  
During his time in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania studying advertising, Somoza Sr. met the 
daughter of a wealthy Nicaraguan, Ana Salvadora DeBayle Sacasa, who he would later 
marry.  Marriage gave Anastasio Somoza access to Managua’s power elites, placing him 
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among the most influential families of Nicaragua.  His ability to speak English well and 
his familiarity with U.S. customs and popular sports also landed him a job as a translator 
for U.S. officials.  Despite his lack of military training, his ties to the United States and 
his standing among Nicaragua’s elites made him the prime candidate to lead the new 
National Guard—Nicaragua’s security forces–in 1926—in combating Augusto Cesar 
Sandino’s rebel forces. 145   
Sandino was a liberal general in the Nicaraguan armed forces, before the creation 
of the National Guard, who was adamantly opposed to U.S. intervention in Nicaragua 
from 1912 to 1933, and refused to lay down his arms as long as U.S. troops occupied his 
homeland.  According to DeFronzo, “Between 1926 and 1933, Sandino’s forces, which 
eventually grew to more than three thousand combatants, battled both several thousand 
marines and the Nicaraguan National Guard.”146  After the presidential elections of 1932, 
the remaining 400 U.S. Marines left Nicaragua on January 2, 1933. As previously 
promised, Sandino negotiated an end to the conflict with the new administration of 
President Juan Bautista Sacasa (Somoza’s wife’s uncle). But while on the surface this 
appeared to be a victory for the government, the agreement left Sandino’s forces in 
defacto control of much of Nicaragua and effectively placed him in competition for 
national political power. 147   
As head of the National Guard, “General” Somoza was completely opposed to 
this agreement and took matters into his own hands.  At the end of a dinner with 
President Sacasa on February 23, 1934, Sandino and two of his generals were seized by 
National Guard soldiers, taken to a nearby field, and executed.  The National Guard also 
surrounded Sandino’s headquarters and killed an estimated 300 of Sandino’s supporters.  
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Although outraged by the murder of his friend, President Sacasa’s demand for justice 
went unanswered.  Later, General Somoza admitted to issuing the order to execute 
Sandino.  For the next two years, Somoza strengthened his grip on the National Guard by 
placing his loyal supporters, some from his own family, in important posts and by passing 
a decree that increased his control over the National Guard.  This increasingly put him at 
odds with Sacasa in a fight that played out in the Nicaraguan Congress and the courts, 
where Somoza generally prevailed.  In command of a loyal National Guard, Somoza 
ambitiously set his sights on the presidency in September 1935.  In May 1936, the 
confrontations between Somoza and Sacasa erupted into civil war.  Somoza’s troops 
surrounded the Presidential Palace and the President’s central stronghold in the city of 
Leon, forcing Sacasa’s resignation on June 6, 1936.  The eight-day civil war culminated 
with Somoza in control of Nicaragua and later becoming president.  When Somoza took 
power, many upper class Nicaraguans considered him of “mala educación” or bad 
breeding because of his rise from the lower order of society.148 
Somoza’s ruthless, unprincipled, and illegal climb to power remained a point of 
contention for many in Nicaragua.  Not only was he seen as illegitimate and incapable, 
but his tyranny and use of position for personal gain produced solidified opposition to his 
rule.  Rigoberto Lopez Perez, a poet and print shop worker, was among the regime’s 
staunchest challengers.  Having lived in El Salvador among anti-Somoza exiles for five 
years, he planned and executed a successful operation to murder Somoza.  On September 
21, 1956, Lopez managed to slip past Somoza’s personal National Guard security detail 
at a party for Somoza’s presidential re-nomination.  Lopez fatally shot Somoza and was 
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immediately killed by bodyguards.  Anastasio Somoza Garcia was declared dead on 
September 29, 1956, at Gorgas Hospital located in the Panama Canal Zone.149 
Unfortunately for Nicaragua, Somosa’s demise failed to terminate the family 
business, as he was succeeded by his eldest son, Luis Somoza Debayle, a graduate of 
Louisiana State University.  Anastasio Somoza’s youngest son, a graduate of the U.S.’ 
West Point Academy, Anastasio Somoza Debayle (nicknamed “Tachito”), took over 
command of the National Guard.  In 1963, Luis Somoza stepped aside and submitted to 
constitutional requirements by allowing Rene Schick, Somoza Sr.’s former foreign 
minster, to become president.  Although Schick became titular president of Nicaragua, 
real power remained with the Somoza family.  Schick’s sudden death in 1966 saw Luis 
Somoza once again claiming the presidency at the end of a bloody electoral campaign 
dominated by anti-Somoza protests.  During one such anti-Somoza protest rally, National 
Guard troops fired into the crowd killing an estimated 40 people.150      
Luis held the presidency barely a year before his brother Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle assumed the office following Luis’ death from a heart attack in 1967.  Anastasio 
Jr. continued to dominate Nicaragua through his use of the National Guard to intimidate 
opposition.  His presidency came to resemble his father’s in regards to corruption, 
intimidation, and use of the National Guard for political and personal gain.  His term in 
office was due to end in May of 1972 in accordance with Nicaragua’s law, which forbade 
immediate presidential re-elections.  However, the innovative Somoza backed by his 
National Guard established a three-man junta that would rule from May 1972 until he 
again became legally eligible in the presidential elections of 1974.151 
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Before that could happen, however, on December 23, 1972, a disastrous 
earthquake struck Managua, destroying almost every building in the city.  Somoza seized 
upon the emergency to assume total executive control over Nicaragua, which allowed 
him to rule by decree until his reelection in 1974.  Somoza took advantage of the 
devastation in Managua to stimulate the economy.  According to Peter Rosset: “The 
destruction of housing, buildings, roads, furniture, and inventories created new 
opportunities for investment and production to replace the items lost.  In addition, a huge 
influx of international and public and private funds for reconstruction and insurance 
created the financing needed for the new investments.”152 
 Unfortunately but not unexpectedly, little of this reconstruction aid filtered down 
to the Nicaraguan people, but instead was siphoned off by Somoza’s government and 
other corrupt middlemen.  “Of the $32 million sent by [U.S. President] Nixon, the 
Nicaraguan Treasury finally accounted for about $16 million,” writes LaFeber.  “The 
[National] Guard sold relief supplies for its own profit.”153  While Somoza’s wealth 
flourished exponentially as a result of the earthquake, popular impatience with Somoza 
was expressed in increased labor unrest, an escalation of political violence, and more 
devastating to the Somoza regime, a rise in overall support for armed opposition.  The 
major difference in the growth of anti-Somoza groups after the earthquake was that now 
the business elites, who also felt cheated by Somoza, jointed the opposition, including the 
radical Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), transforming it into a broad 
political and social resistance.  The growth in opposition was met by an increase in 
repression by the Somoza government, which further accelerated the spiral of 
violence.154  
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The cycle of corruption and repression brought increased international pressure on 
the regime to reform at a time when the Somoza regime was facing a growing FSLN 
threat.  The National Guard lacked the professionalism to thwart an increasingly 
sophisticated armed opposition.  The FSLN conducted several successful operations that 
captured the eye of the international community.  In reaction, Somoza declared a “state of 
siege,” which intensified the atrocious behavior of the National Guard and growth of anti-
Somoza feeling among the populace.  By 1977, Somoza suspended the state of siege in 
order to comply with the U.S. campaign against human rights violations.  The regime 
also assumed that the FSLN was completely wiped-out and no longer posed a legitimate 
threat.155 
Somoza’s temporary loosening of pressure on the FSLN allowed the insurgents to 
reorganize and further extend their domestic support network.  The opening also allowed 
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, a well-known editor of the opposition newspaper (La Prensa), 
to expose many of Somoza’s more corrupt and authoritarian activities.  On January 10, 
1978, a pro-Somoza gunman assassinated Pedro Chamorro.  While he might not have 
been directly responsible for the assassination, Somoza was blamed for Chamorro’s 
death, which led to anti-Somoza protests and strikes over the next twelve months.  
Concurrently, the Sandinistas conducted several attacks on the Somoza regime, resulting 
in increased support for the group among Nicaraguans.  After a major successful attack 
on the National Palace on August 22, 1978, Somoza re-established a state of siege.  Once 
again, the National Guard responded with increased repression.  During the Fall of 1978, 
they used artillery, tanks, and planes to attack neighborhoods in Managua, which resulted 
in the deaths of approximately 5,000 people.  In light of Somoza’s increase in repression 
and the intensification of FSLN operational successes, the United States attempted to 
                                                
155 DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 244; Rosset and Vandermeer, The 
Nicaragua Reader: Documents of a Revolution Under Fire, 152; Tierney, Somozas and Sandinistas: The 
U.S. and Nicaragua in the Twentieth Century, 58–60. 
 57 
mediate negotiations.  However, U.S. pressure on the Somoza regime in the form of a 
curtailment of economic and military aid appeared at the time to make no difference.156 
On May 29, 1979, the FSLN launched the “final offensive” against Somoza’s 
government.  With swollen ranks, the Sandinistas sprung simultaneous and sustained 
attacks in multiple sectors of Nicaragua.  They easily took control of the North, where 
they had concentrated their operations for years and where had the most support.  
Somoza’s stronghold in the South was also being successfully attacked by the FSLN.  In 
one last attempt at reaching a peaceful end to the conflict, Washington proposed the 
deployment of an Organization of American States (OAS) led “peacekeeping forces,” 
which was ultimately rejected by the OAS.  Contributing to the domestic and 
international opposition to Somoza’s regime, the televised killing of ABC’s newsman, 
Bill Stewart, by the National Guard gave the United States no other choice but to order 
Somoza to leave Nicaragua in the hopes of negotiating a moderate post-Somoza regime.  
On July 17, 1979, Somoza fled to Paraguay and the National Guard simultaneously 
disintegrated because of lack of ammunition and the panic that ensued following 
Somoza’s departure.  Sandinista fighters finally captured Managua on July 19, 1979.157  
D. FSLN’S DEVELOPMENT AND RISE TO POWER 
Although the FSLN’s struggle produced heroic figures, the organization’s 
transition to power was not without friction and setbacks.  On July 23, 1961, three young 
men—heavily influenced by the success of the Cuban Revolution—Carlos Fonseca 
Amador, Tomas Borge, and Silvio Mayorga—met in Tegucigalpa, Honduras to establish 
the FSLN.  They revived the name of a national hero, Sandino, to galvanize a new 
generation of anti-Somoza fighters.  All three were influenced by Marxism-Leninism 
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ideology and sought to reproduce the Cuban Revolution in Nicaragua.  Fonseca, the 
illegitimate son of a poor twenty-six year old washerwoman and wealthy administrator of 
Somoza’s properties, was considered the planner and political thinker of the group.  Like 
many other anti-Somoza groups, they set out to recruit members and begin operations 
aimed at toppling Somoza.158  
In 1962, after having previously robbed a few banks in Nicaragua to financially 
support the movement, the young Sandinistas began their campaign for Nicaragua.  They 
drew battle plans, received military training, purchased arms, and established a chain of 
command before they crossed the Honduran border near the mountains of the Miskito 
territory, not far from where General Sandino himself had taken refuge.  This gave them 
logistical safe haven in Honduras while they continued to train and plan, notwithstanding 
a split among the FSLN leadership as to the preparedness of the organization to launch 
active combat operations against Somoza’s National Guard.  In June 1963, a group of 
about sixty Sandinista fighters crossed the Rio Coco River from Honduras to occupy the 
village of Raiti.  They ran into National Guard forces and were destroyed in a devastating 
defeat.  The National Guard killed about a third of the rebel force and the rest fled back 
across the river while others were captured by the Honduran military.  In retrospect, the 
movement lacked peasant logistical support, intelligence, or in-depth knowledge of the 
local terrain.  Additionally, the FSLN did not succeed in communicating their purpose to 
the local peasants.  In fact, researchers noted that the Miskito Indians and peasants in the 
northern border region could rarely tell the difference between the FSLN guerrilla 
fighters and the National Guard.  According to author David Nolan, Borge admitted that 
“where the population was politically and even economically primitive….  Many of them 
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didn’t know how to speak Spanish, and I don’t think they ever understood very well who 
we were.  They weren’t sure whether we were National Guard or what we were.  We 
were truly alien beings for them.”159   
The FSLN remained virtually unknown inside Nicaragua, particularly in the rain 
forest along the Atlantic coast where they were based, through the mid-1960s.  Due to 
their defeat and the realization that they did not have the popular support to continue an 
armed insurgency, the FSLN returned to a pre-insurgency stage in order to regroup and 
build links with the populace.  The Sandinistas chose a new area near Matagalpa to 
establish their base of operations.  They infiltrated thirty-five people into this region and 
organized them into three “columns.”  They raided banks and conducted assassinations, 
while garnering support from the local peasants.  While still divided as to the 
preparedness of the group to conduct overt operations, the FSLN returned to an offensive 
posture in December 1966.  Late in 1967, they attempted a major campaign around 
Pancasan (east of Matagalpa), but the National Guard reacted very efficiently to counter 
them.  On August 27, 1967, the helicopter-borne units of the National Guard decisively 
destroyed the majority of the group by slaying twenty of the 35 rebels, and killing many 
prominent leaders—namely Silvio Mayorga, one of the founding members.  With all their 
efforts to gain support among the population, the FSLN subsequently realized that they 
had miscalculated the amount of support required to conduct overt operations.  “Carlos 
Fonseca wrote later that the Pancasan operation failed because the Sandinistas 
encountered resistance from the peasants they sought to organize and because many of 
the peasants who did join the guerrillas soon deserted.”160  
While Pancasan was a battlefield failure for the FSLN, members of the movement 
considered it a political victory.  They claimed that the operation proved to the whole 
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country that the FSLN still existed and was able to mount attacks against the National 
Guard and Somoza’s regime.  The failed strategy in Pancasan and the almost concurrent 
failure of Che Guevara in Bolivia (October 1967), established an atmosphere of re-focus 
in regards to revolutionary methods.  As noted by Matilde Zimmermann, “Some [FSLN 
leaders] wanted to maintain the focus on rural guerrilla warfare, and others favored 
abandoning the armed struggle to concentrate on political work in the student movement 
and urban barrios.”161 
The Sandinistas remained in the public eye by returning to their fundraising 
operations (bank holdups) and periodic terrorist activities.  The major re-examination of 
their strategy led to an abandoning of the Cuban Revolution’s “foco” theory and adapting 
the strategy of “protracted people’s war”—influenced by Mao Zedong’s On Protracted 
War.  The propaganda campaign became an important part of gaining popular support 
and expressing the specific objectives of the movement, which included a significant 
dependence on Marxist concepts.  The leaflets expressed more confidence than the actual 
size of the organization—approximately one hundred members.  In 1968–1969, the group 
established a formal leadership structure through the establishment of a National 
Directorate.  Carlos Fonseca became a prominent member of the National Directorate as 
the group’s political and military chief in January 1968 and secretary-general in February 
1969—the position he held until his death.  Other leaders of the National Directorate 
included Tomas Borge, Oscar Turcios (veteran guerrillas), Julio Buitrago (urban guerrilla 
leader), Ricardo Morales Aviles (university professor), Henry Ruiz (former Moscow 
student), and Humberto Ortega.  During a meeting in Costa Rica in 1969, the local police 
captured numerous Sandinistas, including Fonseca himself.  By the time of Fonseca’s 
release in 1970, the FSLN, with the help of an increasing anti-Somoza/anti-National 
Guard sentiment, had rebuilt and gained enough recruits to once again conduct another 
military initiative.162   
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The military operation was called the Zinica campaign.  Zinica operations, mostly 
supported by peasants, marked a significant success for the FSLN when, for the first 
time, the guerrilla group was able to engage the National Guard in frontal combat without 
being destroyed.  More importantly, the Somoza regime was unable to hide their losses 
against the guerrillas when one of its helicopter gunships was downed.  The Zinica 
campaign significantly increased the FSLN’s confidence and facilitated the growth of a 
larger support base.  By this point, the Sandinista group changed from a small, 
unorganized guerrilla band to an organized, supported, and integrated insurgency that 
posed a legitimate threat to Somoza’s regime.  John A. Booth notes that, 
“From 1970 on the National Guard began to respond differently to the FSLN.”163 
From 1971 to 1973, an increase in demonstrations tied to political reform led 
Somoza to release several Sandinistas from prison.  During this time, the FSLN lowered 
its military profile and continued to “grow in silence.”  The civic unrest was punctuated 
by the December 1972 Managua earthquake, rising labor conflicts, high inflation, and 
political dissatisfaction with Somoza’s efforts to engineer a return to the office of the 
presidency.  As previously noted, the Somoza government lost the already dwindling 
support of the middle- and upper-class businessmen because of the accusation of 
corruption during the earthquake—a significant blow to Somoza’s popular support, 
which further kindled the anti-Somoza sentiment.  The FSLN took advantage of the 
growing unrest and anti-Somoza mood in 1974 to resume military operations.  On 
December 27, 1974, the Sandinista executed an extremely bold and risky operation at 
the house of a wealthy cotton exporter and former minister of agriculture, Jose Maria 
Castillo Quant.  Mr. Castillo was holding a party in honor of U.S. Ambassador Turner 
B. Shelton.  Although Ambassador Shelton had just departed the event half on hour 
earlier, the FSLN was able to hold prominent hostages—namely Guillermo Sevilla 
Sacasa (Somoza’s brother-in-law) and Noel Pallais Debayle (Somoza’s first cousin).    
Ultimately Somoza complied with all of the Sandinista’s demands.  The success of the 
operation contributed to the movement’s popularity and fundraising, but also infuriated 
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Somoza, who established a state of siege, which caused significant losses of personnel 
and cohesion within the Sandinistas.164  
The state of siege, which resulted in press censorship and a curfew from dusk to 
dawn among other repressive measures, lasted for 33 months.  Fueled by the 
embarrassing raid, Somoza’s counterinsurgency operations were defined by a form of 
terrorist state that did not distinguish citizen from insurgent.  Allegedly, hundreds of 
peasant families disappeared, culminating in an estimated 3,000 deaths.  The ferocity of 
the National Guard’s counterinsurgency operations kept the FSLN pinned down and 
eventually resulted in the killing of several of the movement’s leaders—most notably 
Carlos Fonseca’s on November 8, 1976.  The losses and differences in both strategy and 
ideology created a significant rift within the FSLN, which resulted in the fractionalization 
of the movement into three factions: 
1. Proletarians (Proletarios):  Led by Jaime Wheelock (among 
others), this group sought to mobilize the urban working class to 
defeat Somoza.  They planned to organize the labor unions and 
majority of urban residents of Nicaragua’s poor neighborhoods in 
order to promote mass strikes and demonstrations to destabilize 
Somoza’s reign over Nicaragua.   
2. Prolonged People’s War (Guerra Popular Prolongada):  Led by 
Tomas Borge and Henry Ruiz, this faction’s strategy was based on 
rural warfare as the key to success.  Influenced by Mao, the plan 
was to gradually buildup peasant support in order to construct a 
large revolutionary force to root out Somoza’s regime.   
3.  Third Way (Terceristas):  Led by Daniel and Humberto Ortega, 
this faction set their sights on victory through two methods—a. de-
emphasize Carlos Fonseca’s original Marxists ideology and b. 
advocate bolder attacks.  Their moderate message led to the 
support of non-Marxist socialists, Catholic and Protestant social 
activists, and other anti-Somoza groups that sought social reform 
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and democracy.  The Terceristas were most successful at 
promoting wide spread insurrection.165  
All three factions continued to gain popularity and recruits to carry out their 
operations.  By the end of 1978, the Terceristas proved to be the more effective of the 
three and gained the most popularity among Nicaraguans because of their broad 
ideological views.  The assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro on January 10, 1978, 
was a critical turning point for the Somoza regime.  His death, while within the range of 
plausible denial not directly a result of Somoza’s orders, was nevertheless blamed on the 
regime, which created a “firestorm” of support for anti-Somoza movements.  The FSLN’s 
recruitment swelled to its highest numbers (approximately 1,000 fighters).  On August 
22, 1978, the boldness of the FSLN surpassed that of the 1974 raid when 25 Sandinistas, 
disguised as National Guardsmen, occupied the National Palace.  The FSLN captured 
over 2,000 hostages during this operation—most of the Congress and several of 
Somoza’s relatives.  It was a complete success for the FSLN.  Not only did Somoza meet 
all their demands, but also many Nicaraguans praised the operations and viewed the 
leader of the operation—“Commandante Zero”, Eden Pastora—as a hero and cheered the 
group on their way to the airport for their flight to Cuba.  The audaciousness of the 
mission fueled mass mobilization against the regime.  According to Walter LaFeber, the 
FSLN army swelled to 7,000 guerrillas.  By September 1978, at least eight cities in 
Nicaragua experienced mass protests against Somoza.166 
Somoza’s regime continued to fuel the revolution by establishing another state of 
siege.  The National Guard was able to regain control of the cities through continued 
shelling, bombing, and airstrikes.  In total, the National Guard killed approximately 
1,500–2,000 people—mostly civilians.  Although they gained control of the cities, “the 
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terror unleashed to defend the dynasty only strengthened the will to resist.”167  All three 
factions of the FSLN took advantage of the public’s anger and coordinated a general 
strike and increased national armed insurrection.  The general strike, endorsed by the 
majority of national businesses and industrial chambers, resulted in approximately 
75 percent of businesses closing across the country.  According to Booth, “on 9 
September 1978, columns of Sandinistas attacked and overran National Guard stations in 
Leon, Managua, Masaya, Esteli, Chinandega, and Chichigalpa.”168  The National 
Guard’s defeat undermined the morale and discipline of the force.  Their atrocities 
reached the highest levels with reports of murders, rapes, looting, and overall destruction 
of property.169 
With so much ground being gained by the insurgents, talks of reconsolidation 
became reality when on March 3, 1979, a formal reunification of the FSLN took place.  
The reunification resulted in nine leaders, or governing directorates, for the FSLN—three 
representatives from each faction were selected.  The reunion also led to an overall 
moderate philosophical change.  Another transformation saw the increase in support for 
the FSLN by the international community and the loss of legitimacy by the Somoza 
regime.  Attempts at OAS mediation by the United States, the Dominican Republic, and 
Guatemala failed.  Somoza’s intransigence, continued oppression, and the failure of 
negotiation efforts led to spontaneous rebellions throughout Nicaragua.  Economic chaos 
added to the Somoza’s regime losing its control.  Booth posited that “in March 1979, the 
Central Bank defaulted on interest payments of $65 million to international private banks, 
adding to the $23 million interest payment already missed in December 1978.”170   
The Somoza regime’s downward spiral along with continued human rights 
violations led the United States to cut off all military and financial aid to the regime—a 
crippling blow to Somoza and inspiration to the FSLN.  The Sandinistas launched their 
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final offensive on May 29, 1979 with attacks from quadrants surrounding Managua.  The 
National Guard lost ground in the countryside and attempted to “preserve order” by 
increasing bombings on cities, neighborhoods, slums, and destroying factories and 
businesses.  Nothing the National Guard attempted seemed to be working in their favor—
instead it fueled insurrection.  On June 20, 1979, the National Guard’s repressive 
behavior gained international attention when a National Guardsman murdered ABC 
television correspondent Bill Stewart, point-blank, in front of his own camera crew.  The 
little international support left for the Somoza regime dissipated with the stunning, 
televised, event.  Domestic pressures, in light of Bill Stewart’s death, pushed U.S. 
President Carter to terminate Somoza’s regime.  Washington demanded Somoza’s 
resignation an initiative supported by a 17 to 2 vote in the OAS for removal of Somoza.  
Booth notes that, in a reprise of Batista’s flight from Cuba on New Year’s Eve 1959, 
“panic among Somocistas followed, as hundreds of remaining officials and collaborators 
crowded Las Mercedes airport in a rush to leave.”171  
Ten days after the televised murder of Bill Stewart, Somoza broadcasted the 
conditions for his resignation: “preservation of the Liberal Nationalist party and the 
National Guard.”172  The Carter administration’s proposal for a deployment of an OAS 
peacekeeping force to help the transition from Somoza’s control to a five-person Junta, 
which the U.S. government recognized as the future government of Nicaragua, was 
rejected.  With the National Guard’s disintegration at hand, Somoza finally left Nicaragua 
on July 17, 1979.  The National Guard, panicked by Somoza’s departure, completely 
collapsed by July 18 which allowed the FSLN to take complete control of Managua on July 
19 in the wake of a victory march.  “On 20 July 1979, members of the junta arrived in 
Managua from already liberated Leon to commence rebuilding a Nicaragua laid waste by 
war.”173 
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This chapter established the historical background required to further explore the 
critical factors leading to the success of the both the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions.  
It presented the details for Batista’s reign along with the M-26-7’s development and 
eventual rise to power in Cuba.  Similarly, it offered a historical background for the rise 
of the Somoza family and the FSLN’s inception, growth, and ensuing seizure of control 
in Nicaragua.  In combination with the theories and life cycle model covered in Chapter 
II, this chapter allows for a focused historical analysis (Chapters IV and V) that will 





IV. THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 
This section offers a recapitulation of the four major factors that contributed to the 
success of the Cuban Revolution.  The intentions in this chapter is to isolate the specific 
circumstances that better account for the outcome of the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and 
provide a more focused analysis of the critical factors.   
A. LEADERSHIP 
1. The Shortcomings of Batista’s Leadership 
Leadership’s strategic decisions, for both the incumbent power and insurgency, 
significantly contributed to the success of the Revolution.  Although many of Batista’s 
strategies as president and commander of the armed forces from 1933 to 1952 have not 
historically been factored into analyses of Fidel Castro’s success, in retrospect it becomes 
clear that Batista’s 1952 coup seriously undermined his government’s legitimacy, both in 
the eyes of the Cuban population, and abroad.  The popular perception was that Batista’s 
coup occurred when it became apparent that he was running third in the preliminary 
round of that year’s presidential election.  This failure to allow the democratic process to 
play out triggered significant anti-Batista sentiment that culminated in multiple 
insurgencies (urban and rural) throughout Cuba.174    
One group of rebels, the M-26-7 led by Castro, failed to mount a successful attack 
in 1953 and its major co-conspirators were jailed.  Batista’s strategy to gain popularity by 
granting amnesty to Castro and his most prominent followers backfired when in 1956, 
Castro’s M-26-7 returned to finish what they had started—topple Batista.  The 
movement’s second attempt was another grand failure, which nearly resulted in the 
group’s dismantling.  Nevertheless, Batista’s legitimacy problems continued, so that 
Castro’s forces were able to secure a “liberated zone” in the Sierra Maestra Mountains to 
regroup and gain strength.  A New York Times interview with Castro proved Batista’s 
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boast that he had wiped out the M-26-7 and killed its leader to be a lie, further 
undermining the Cuban dictator’s credibility.175  
With the significant increase in insurgent operations on the island, Batista resorted 
to repressive techniques characteristic of a repressive regime—selective assassinations, 
arbitrary arrests, closing of universities, and censorship of the press.  Batista’s “no 
prisoners” order in the late 1950s further alienated the Cuban population when even 
surrendered insurgents and political activists were killed or disappeared. Batista’s 
rigorous repression of political dissent contrasted with his mafiacracy’s toleration for 
other forms of illegal activity, especially gambling and prostitution for which 1950s Cuba 
was notorious, and this further contributed to widespread state corruption.176   
State corruption extended to Batista’s personal control over the military.  
Although more details regarding the Cuban military’s influence on the outcome of the 
revolution will be covered later in this chapter, it is important to note that Batista’s direct 
intervention in military affairs beginning with the 1933 “sergeant’s mutiny” which in 
essence transformed the Cuban military into his personal fiefdom, accelerated a process 
of the politicization and hence the de-professionalization of the armed forces.  Of the 
roughly 500 officers in the armed forces in 1933, 384 resigned after Batista “transitioned” 
from sergeant to colonel in the wake of the coup.  Batista further enflamed the divide in 
the military by promoting 527 enlisted men to officer rank in the years following his 
appointment as Chief of Staff.  The politization and personalistic control of the military 
contributed to the internal corruption and institutional decline.  Promotions were not 
based on personal loyalty to Batista.  Ultimately, his control over the armed forces 
undermined morale, solidarity, professionalism, and patriotism necessary to defeat the 
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insurgents. Batista further demoralized his forces in 1958 by firing several top generals 
and personally taking command of failing units.177  
Even as conditions deteriorated in Cuba and his regime appeared doomed, Batista 
clung even more tightly to power.  He refused to hold early elections in order to diffuse 
the country’s discontent and rejected negotiations with moderates such as the Catholic 
Church and “Friends of the Republic Society” that might have resulted in a moderate 
reformist alternative to Castro’s Marxism.  After initial missteps, Castro ultimately 
proved able to capitalize on Batista’s miscalculations and failure to reform which left the 
Dictator with miniscule popular support and a hollow military to lead the revolution to 
victory for lack of viable alternatives.178  
2. M-26-7’s Leadership 
Although Castro’s two initial attempts at toppling Batista (1953 and 1956) were 
utter failures, he was able to learn from his mistakes and through his charisma and 
strategic adjustments, capitalize on the growing anti-Batista sentiment in Cuban society.  
Before Castro’s amphibious reinsertion in 1956, he made a strategic pact with a strong 
network of anti-Batista squatters (guajiros) in Oriente Province’s Sierra Maestra region.  
The agreement with the oppressed squatters proved critical to the movement’s existence 
after their failed confrontation with Batista’s army because it gave his movement a 
popular and secure base, which it had heretofore lacked.  Additionally, Castro proved 
very successful at acquiring funds from anti-Batista exiles, which helped finance his 
insurgency.179 
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Castro’s achievement of what today might be termed “information dominance” 
was extremely successful and a major contributor to his victory.180  As noted by Gordon 
McCormick, information superiority allows insurgents to pick their battle space and even 
control their casualties.181  From the on-set of his revolution, Castro was able to conflate 
his struggle with that of earlier national heroes, most notably José Martí—Cuban hero 
and revered by Cubans as the father of Cuba’s independence from Spain.  As noted in the 
“Program Manifesto of the 26th of July Movement,” Castro’s vision was to continue the 
fight for Cuban sovereignty that Martí and others launched in the 1890s: 
We are resuming the unfinished Cuban Revolution.  That is why we 
preach the same ‘necessary war’ of José Martí for exactly the same 
reasons he proclaimed it: against the repressive ills of the colony, against 
the sword that shelters tyrants, against corrupt and rapacious politicians, 
against the merchants of our national economy.182 
Castro’s arrival from Mexico by boat in 1956 with 81 armed revolutionaries and 
his use of the Oriente Province to regroup his forces after his second failed attack 
symbolized the congruence between José Martí’s 1895 invading force and his own, an 
analogy which he emphasized in his propaganda.183  
In addition to undermining Batista’s credibility, Castro’s interview with the New 
York Times served as a tremendous use of propaganda and an equally symbolic use of 
Jose Marti’s heroism.184  Jose Marti, who lived in New York from 1881 to 1895 as a 
critic for the New York Sun, cleverly arranged an interview after his landing in Oriente 
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with the New York Herald in order to gain international support for the independence of 
Cuba.185  Castro’s interview with Herbert Matthews from the New York Times on 
February 17, 1957 had both domestic and international affects.  Although having only 
about fifteen trained guerrillas at the time of the interview, Castro told Matthews that his 
forces were organized in groups of between 10 and 40 men.  He even had one of his men 
deliver him a fictitious message from the imaginary “second column” to report on their 
success against the “demoralized” Cuban Army.  Although some might claim that the 
forces consisted of the Sierra Maestra squatters, it is also generally accepted that the 
squatters were not trained in guerrilla warfare before the interview.186  
Understanding the importance of U.S. support for his cause, Castro “appeared to 
be a non-Marxist, moderate nationalist with U.S.-style democratic ideas.  Although he 
displayed hostility to the U.S. government for providing bombers, weapons, and 
munitions to Batista, he claimed the rebels wanted friendship with the United States.”187  
Matthew’s report claimed that Castro “ ‘has a mastery of the Sierra Maestra’ and opined 
that ‘General Batista cannot possibly hope to suppress the Castro revolt.’”188   
Of course, propaganda would have been proven of limited effectiveness had 
Batista had been able to muster a modicum of domestic and international legitimacy. The 
larger-than-life personality of Castro at the head of his movement of rural insurgents 
appealed both to peasants and the middle class in Cuba.  The fact that a group of “rough 
and tough” young men and women, many of them like Castro middle class and university 
educated, were willing to risk their lives and live in remote areas of Cuba in order to 
continue the revolutionary cause started by Martí was (and still is for some) a 
romanticized propaganda narrative.  The barbudos or bearded ones, as they were called, 
exemplified the David and Goliath story in the bible.  Castro, knowing that the image of 
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the rural forces led by educated revolutionaries resonated in Latin American history since 
the rebellion against Spain after 1808, disregarded and even condemned the actions of 
urban guerrillas as an illegitimate, new-fangled strategy, discredited by Mao and Ho Chi 
Minh’s twentieth century success with peasant revolution.  Victors invariably spin the 
explanations for their success, and so in the case of the Cuban Revolution, the 
contributions of urban guerrillas were de-emphasized.  In fact, the urban guerrillas were 
the stronger force when Castro decided to conduct his failed amphibious assault with 
only 81 men.  Also, the urban guerrillas recruited most of the 82 men that constituted 
Castro’s forces.  After the failed amphibious attack in Oriente in 1956, when Castro had 
fifteen total men (including himself), the urban guerrillas kept Batista’s forces occupied 
and continued to play a critical role in recruiting both urban and rural guerrilla forces.189   
In a show of strength, on March 13, 1957, an urban guerrilla attack on Batista’s 
presidential palace nearly assassinated Batista and prepared conditions for a take over of 
the government.  This was the closest any guerrilla force had ever come to killing Batista.  
Instead of showing support for the urban guerrillas who had come close to destabilizing 
Batista’s government, Castro condemned the attacks—an obvious ploy to gain “points” 
for his public relations propaganda campaign.190  In 1969, almost ten years after the 
conclusion of the revolution, when Castro was secure as the leader of Cuba with 
overwhelming domestic support as well as Soviet sponsorship, he conceded the 
importance of the urban guerrillas to his success:   
Almost all attention, almost all recognition, almost all the admiration, and 
almost all the history of the Revolution [has] centered on the guerrilla 
movement in the mountains….  This fact tended to play down the role of 
those who fought in the cities, the role of those who fought in the 
clandestine movement, and the extraordinary heroism of young persons 
who died fighting under very difficult conditions.191   
Castro’s ability to capitalize on Batista’s mistakes was also illustrated through the 
use of rebel-created radio stations.  Batista’s repression of media through nationwide 
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censorship provided Castro with a niche in the propaganda realm.  While there were 
several clandestine radio transmitters used by the M-26-7 group, the most notorious was 
Radio Rebelde, which began broadcasting on February 23, 1958.  According to Philip 
Brenner, “Cuban audiences eager to hear news not censured by the Batista government 
consequently tuned in to Radio Rebelde…,” which was run “by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, 
who eventually became one of the most listened-to voices in Cuba and much of the 
Caribbean.”192  Radio Rebelde also helped gain rebel support from within the 
demoralized Batista military.  In one broadcast Castro stated, “We are at war with the 
tyranny, not with the armed forces.”193   
Castro ramped-up propaganda and capitalized on the fact that the Cuban Army 
was disillusioned with Batista and its corrupt military commanders.  With a core of 
disillusioned young military officers (and some high ranking) providing intelligence, 
Castro’s forces were able to avoid military sweeps and even to manipulate the Cuban Air 
Force’s bombing codes (provided by defectors of Batista’s military) to napalm Batista’s 
own men.  Many poorly trained and disheartened Cuban Army soldiers were captured by 
the rural guerrillas and later released by Castro in a continued effort to garner support 
from the armed forces and the populace.  In one such instance, Raul Castro (Fidel 
Castro’s brother and commander of guerrilla forces) conveyed to one of the groups of 
released soldiers: “We took you this time.  We can take you again.  And when we do we 
will not frighten or torture or kill you, anymore than we are doing to you at this 
moment.”194 
Castro was also able to consolidate major insurgent groups in Cuba, both urban 
and rural, by creating and assuming the leadership of the National Directorate.  This 
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unification of efforts created two unified fronts that proved too difficult for Batista’s 
forces to handle—ultimately leading to his downfall.195 
B. POPULAR SUPPORT 
1. Batista’s Popular Support 
As previously indicated, the repressive nature of Batista’s regime and Castro’s 
ability to capitalize on his miscalculations resulted in a lopsided battle for popular 
support, which was instrumental to the outcome of the Cuban Revolution.  In addition to 
Batista’s undemocratic and corrupt rule, he lost significant support when he did not 
deliver on his promises to improve the deteriorating social, political, and economic 
environment in Cuba.  Continued government corruption, uneven distribution of wealth, 
high unemployment (mostly in rural areas), and the overall decline of real income in the 
1950s contributed to the growing grievances in Cuban society.196  
Batista’s only support in 1952 was based on the popular reforms implemented 
during his first period in power from 1933.  Many lower class Cubans supported Batista, 
a mulatto of modest origins, especially Afro-Cubans who generally occupied the lower 
rungs of Cuban society.  The middle- and upper-classes were tolerant of Batista during 
the early 1950s.  As mentioned above, Batista’s popular support began to plummet when 
the New York Times interview with Castro was televised, which served to undermine his 
credibility.  Batista continued to maintain the support of the Communist party in Cuba 
until the late 1950’s, when his reign was clearly unraveling. While surprising in 
retrospect given the subsequent support given Castro by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR), traditional communist parties in Latin America tended to look upon 
rural insurgents as romantics, in the doctrinaire belief that urban working classes made 
revolutions, not peasants. Batista’s growing corruption and aggressive repression that did 
not distinguish between insurgents and regular citizens gradually undermined support and 
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made Castro, who shrewdly obfuscated his true goals, appear as a viable option.   
Batista’s mafiacracy anchored in a military made up of lower class upstarts embarrassed 
the upper-class and pushed the middle-class to desire constitutional rule—two critical 
sectors of Cuban society.  Batista’s unwillingness to negotiate or hold elections toward 
the end of his regime also diminished his already evaporating popular support.  
Ultimately, Batista lost legitimacy among all spectrums of Cuban society, which directly 
kindled support for his opposition.197 
2. M-26-7’s Popular Support 
Throughout the growing discontent with Batista’s regime, Castro successfully 
exploited the government’s blunders in both the domestic and international realm.  The 
M-26-7’s use of mass media, their moderate message, and creation of the National 
Directorate combined to boost support for the movement.  The significant support 
provided by the 50,000 strong network of squatters also provided a popular base for the 
insurgency.  It is also important to note that initial support for Castro’s movement came 
from universities (which had autonomy from government intrusion), urban youth, and 
professionals.  Since the urban guerrilla fighters contributed to the overall success of the 
Batista opposition (including the M-26-7), the bulk of the Cuban armed forces 
concentrated their offensive on them.  This resulted in the growing defeat of the urban 
guerrilla fighters and left Castro’s barbudos as the only viable opposition.  The M-26-7’s 
promises of free elections, land reform, and improvements in schools and health care 
system further increased popular support for the revolution.  Towards the end of the 
insurgency, a combination of battlefield victories and the release of Cuban Army 
prisoners helped the movement gain further popular support and more importantly, 
undermined the will to resist within Batista’s Army.198  
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C. EXTERNAL INFLUENCE  
External factors also significantly contributed to the success of the Cuban 
Revolution.  Beginning before the M-26-7 came to existence, the United States’ 
intervention in Cuba contributed to the instability that created an environment where 
revolution was possible.  Barrington Moore notes that the “Politics of a small nations are 
determined in large part by the actions of the larger nations around them.”199  Some 
theorists note that from Cuba’s colonial period, Washington’s direct and extended 
politico-military intervention weakened domestic party politics and encouraged states of 
mafiacracies.  While this case can be argued, it is also true that the US’ intervention 
allowed Cuba to break free from Spain and gain a level of independence never 
experienced in its history.  In either case, their early involvement did allow for the chain 
of events that led to the Cuban Revolution in 1959.200 
A persistent external factor to the revolution, the United States, both directly and 
indirectly, influenced the outcome of the Cuban Revolution.  At the beginning of the 
Cold War, the United States trained the Cuban Army to be an element of defense in the 
Western Hemisphere in case of Soviet invasion.  As important, particularly during the 
last two years of the insurgency, the U.S.’ failure from 1958 to provide military 
assistance to the Batista government in combating the insurgency may be said to have 
provided the final blow to a failing Batista regime.  Starting with the symbolically 
important arms embargo in March, both the government and military’s morale 
plummeted to its lowest level.  The M-26-7 fighters, conversely, became more 
emboldened and Cuban society as a whole recognized that Batista’s days were 
numbered.201 
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Adding to the already demoralized regime, Washington withdrew recognition of 
Batista’s government following the corrupt elections of 1958. The United States went as 
far as to ask Batista to leave the island, both in order to contain the growing 
dissatisfaction in Cuba and as a prelude to a peaceful resolution of the political imbroglio. 
At the same time, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) attempted to free Colonel 
Ramon Barquin, jailed in 1956 for his failed coup attempt against Batista, from Cuban 
prison to provide a credible alternative to both Batista and Castro.  Unfortunately, the 
attempt was futile because the imprisoned colonel was already a member of the M-26-7 
and not a “democratic” alternative to Castro.202 
The CIA was also said to have provided direct assistance to Castro’s forces.  Tad 
Szulc, a reporter and author, claimed that the CIA provided no less than $50,000 to 
central figures of the M-26-7.  Other significant support for Castro’s movement came 
from anti-Batista exiles and American sympathizers living in the United States.  Ex-
Cuban President and exile, Carlos Prio, was charged in the United States for taking part 
in actions supporting Castro’s movement.  Researchers claim that the M-26-7’s funds 
amounted to hundreds of thousands of dollars, with Castro having a steady monthly 
income of $10,000.  The guerrillas were also said to have enjoyed long-term and 
sustained arms assistance from abroad.  In fact, during 1957 alone, the US government 
intercepted approximately $250,000 worth of shipments headed to the M-26-7.  While 
this amount seems significant, particularly for the time, historians presume that most of 
the shipments got through anyway—making up only an estimated 15% of Castro’s 
weapons.  Similarly, the interim revolutionary government in Venezuela allegedly gave 
Castro about $50,000 in 1958 alone and airplanes from Costa Rica landed in a Sierra 
Maestra landing strip with arms and other hardware.  
Another external factor that allowed the M-26-7 to regroup after initial failed 
attack on the Moncada Barracks (and later pardon) was the safe haven provided by 
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Mexico where Castro was able to join some of his friends (namely his brother Raul 
Castro and Ernesto “Che” Guevara), study political philosophy, began training in the 
basics of irregular warfare, and to plan his second attack on Batista’s regime.  In addition, 
Castro also received arms from Mexico throughout his insurgency.203  
After his second failed attack on the Batista regime and escape to the Sierra 
Maestra Mountains, Castro effectively used international media to support his cause. As 
previously noted, the televised interview with the New York Times helped the M-26-7 and 
harmed the Batista regime, which increased both domestic and international support for 
the M-26-7.204 
Lastly, the Catholic’s Church’s failed attempts to open a dialogue with the Batista 
regime toward the end of his reign was a symbolic blow that proved Batista’s 
intransigence and further sealed the ruler’s fate.205 
D. MILITARY FACTORS 
The Cuban military contributed to the outcome of the Cuban Revolution in 
numerous ways.  In order to start understanding its contribution, it is first necessary to 
examine the Cuban military’s history.  Like most Latin American militaries, that of Cuba, 
established in 1909, was not built for the purpose of protecting the nation against foreign 
enemies, but instead to protect the interests of the privileged classes by insuring internal 
order.  Adding to its already weak institutional structure, President Gerardo Machado 
(1925—1933) further undermined professionalism in the military by promoting those 
most loyal to his regime.  Machado also gained favor with the military by increasing pay 
and improving overall conditions—some were considered lavish in comparison to 
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majority of the Cuban populace.  Having the majority of the military on his side, 
Machado became a corrupt, repressive, and bloody dictator.  His extension of political 
patronage into the ranks of the military created an office corps more interested in 
personal enrichment and political influence than achieving military proficiency. While 
this was particularly true in the upper ranks, junior officers were expected to play the 
game in the hopes that one day they too would gain access to wealth and privilege. This 
created a split among the young (optimistic) and the older (corrupt) officers, which had 
the unintended consequence of politicizing and strengthening the position of the non-
commissioned officers corps (NCO) and enlisted ranks.206  
In these conditions of politicization of the Cuban military, in 1933, the 
opportunistic Sergeant Batista organized a successful coup both against Machado’s 
regime and the Cuban officers who supported it.  The rise of Batista to colonel and as 
head of the military after the 1933 coup added to the military discontent.  A majority of 
the officers correctly viewed Batista as unqualified for the position and resigned in 
protest, an act which misfired as it allowed Batista to grant an unprecedented 527 
commissions to enlisted men.  But rather than revive professionalism in the Cuban 
military, it became a case of plus ça change, as Batista used it as a tool of personal 
patronage much as had Machado.  From 1933 to 1952, Batista ruled Cuba either directly 
as president or from the wings as armed forces chief.  Batista based officer promotions on 
loyalty to him and frequently passed over officers trained in the United States.  This 
deepened the divide in the Cuban officer’s corps between “politicals” and 
“professionals,” which further weakened the institution.  The creation of the Cuban 
military academy in 1940 to provide some basic entrance requirements and a professional 
foundation proved to be too-little, too-late to make a significant difference in the armed 
forces.207 
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Before 1956, Batista’s military was already too weak to defeat an insurgency that 
was gathering momentum for reasons mentioned above.  Professionalism was severely 
lacking, civil-military tensions remained high, and Batista’s corruption turned the 
military into a beneficiary of the government’s spoils system.  The regime would use the 
military as an arbiter in politics and to stifle labor movement strikes.  By the time 
Castro’s forces attempted their second failed attack on Batista’s regime, the Cuban 
military was abusing and exploiting peasants in the Oriente region.  This led to a growing 
opposition to Batista’s armed forces.  At the direction of Oriente landlords, Batista’s 
army evicted squatters, adding to the province’s misery.  Squatters also became collateral 
damage during operations against “guerrillas.”  By mid-1956, Colonel Ramon Barquin 
and other officers had tired of Batista’s use of the military as his private domain and 
conspired to remove him. Although Barquin’s military coup failed, it provided a 
worrisome sign of growing discontent within the military.208 
The dissatisfaction of a portion of the military with the regime gradually 
transitioned into sympathy for the revolution.  There was a general sense of disgust 
among fellow soldiers, caused both by internal corruption and Batista’s “no prisoners” 
order in late 1950s.  On September 5, 1957, a group of young pro-Castro naval officers 
stationed at a base in Cienfuegos, violently clashed with the army.  Although the 
uprising—later named the naval mutiny—was brief, it proved to both the military and the 
guerrillas that anti-Batista sentiment within the military was at a climax.  The crumbling 
cohesion of the military, its discontent with Batista, a low level of professionalism, and 
the army’s inability to find and destroy Castro’s forces led Batista to take drastic 
measures.  During the height of the fighting in 1958, Batista reorganized his army to 
instill some energy and better direct their efforts. Unfortunately for him, it actually 
compounded his problems—he kept his most trusted and best-trained officers near him 
for personal protection and dispatched the young officers and recruits to fight in the 
mountains against battle-hardened guerrillas.  He also reduced military training from 6 
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months to 30 days, which contributed to repeated failures against the rural guerrillas and 
increased their susceptibility to Castro’s propaganda, which reached them principally 
through Radio Rebelde.209 
Batista’s failed offensive in 1958 proved that his reorganization of the military did 
not help his campaign against the M-26-7.  Instead, it lowered morale and essentially 
opened a pathway for Castro’s forces to march on Havana.  The last time the Cuban army 
set foot in the highly contested Sierra Maestra Mountains was 1958.  Commanding 
officers refused to fight rebels and some continued to organize mutinies against Batista.  
The second in command of Cuban intelligence was already providing the M-26-7 with 
critical information. Batista was made aware of his armed force’s powerlessness in late 
1958 when a prominent general told him that soldiers were tired and officers would not 
fight.  By this point, soldiers, already poorly trained and who were not paid, refused to 
fight, while air force pilots grounded their aircraft.  News of army troops surrendering 
and crossing over to the guerrilla lines had become a common occurrence.210 
The actions of the United States—arms embargo and withdrawal of recognition 
for the regime—also significantly reduced the armed force’s morale and will to fight.  
When the M-26-7 began their offensive in the fall of 1958, the Cuban army was so 
institutionally weakened that they withdrew in the face of oncoming (numerically 
inferior) rebel forces.  A far superior Cuban Army garrison surrendered to Castro in the 
city of Santiago, which had a domino effect resulting in Castro’s force’s triumphant 
march to Havana.211 
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This chapter confirms that the four major factors presented here were critical 
contributors to the success of the Cuban Revolution.  The focused historical analysis 
presented in this chapter strengthens the assertion made in this thesis that the four major 
contributors to the success of the Cuban Revolution were leadership, popular support, 
external influence, and the military. This allows for a more focused and descriptive 
analysis of the Cuban Revolution in regards to the theories presented in Chapter II.  The 
following chapter will provide a similar analysis of the Nicaraguan Revolution.  
 83 
V. THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION 
As in Cuba in the 1950s, the success of Nicaragua’s 1979 Revolution can be 
attributed to the same four factors in the previous chapter: leadership, popular support, a 
favorable international environment, and an incumbent military that was politicized, 
repressive, corrupt, and unprofessional.  
1. The Shortcomings of Somoza’s Leadership 
Chalmers Johnson noted that, “elite intransigence… always serves as an 
underlying cause of revolution.”212  Like Batista in Cuba, Somoza ran Nicaragua as what 
Wickham-Crowley describes as a mafiacratic state.  Nicaragua was run as a Somoza 
family enterprise under the direction of its patriarch Anastasio Somoza Debayle 
(“Tachito”).213  “The ‘neopatrimonial’ (or ‘sultanistic’) character of the Somoza 
dictatorship, coupled with Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s own unpredictable and self-
destructive behavior—which, under the circumstances, was necessarily state-destructive 
behavior—was the key factor behind the rapid Sandinista triumph,” writes Jeff 
Goodwin.214 
Somoza’s long reign was anchored primarily in his ability to divide his opponents 
through a combination of intimidation (with the use of the National Guard), bribery, and 
when necessary, imprisonment and death.  Under the Somoza family rule, Nicaragua was 
militarized and economically underdeveloped.215  Most scholars of the Nicaraguan 
Revolution agree that the Somoza regime was “constantly exclusionary, anti-reformist, 
and more or less indiscriminately repressive of their political opponents (moderates and 
reformists as well as revolutionaries) throughout the 1960s and 1970s.”216  These 
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characteristics contributed to the international and geopolitical isolation that facilitated 
the ultimate success of the FSLN.217 
From its inception, the Somoza family used the National Guard to enforce their 
mafiacracy.  The repressive use of the National Guard peaked during the 1970s, when 
Somoza employed them for personal gain and as a tool to remain in power.218 
While the vast majority of Nicaragua’s population lived a poor or modest 
lifestyle, the Somoza family wielded their political power for personal enrichment, in 
particular by siphoning off U.S. aid and private investments that poured into Nicaragua.  
They also benefited from “prostitution, gambling, construction kickbacks, and 
taxation.”219  A Nicaraguan banker noted: “It was an ingenious thing.  For 45 years the 
Somoza family ran this country like their own private enterprise.  The country was only a 
mechanism to invest abroad.”220 However, they also “invested” at home, owning 
approximately two million acres with 274 properties (46 houses, 69 haciendas, 76 other 
urban lots, 13 industries, 16 unframed land holdings, among others), a fifth of the 
national agriculture production, and numerous foreign assets.221 
As noted earlier, Somoza’s corruption knew no shame, when he pocketed most of 
the money donated for recovery and reconstruction efforts following the 1972 earthquake 
that devastated Managua. President Nixon sent $32 million of which $16 million was 
unaccounted for. Corruption on this scale proved too much, even for Nicaragua’s business-
class, which never forgave him. The grievances created by the devastating earthquake were 
amplified by the realization that Somoza was taking advantage of the populace’s suffering 
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for his own enrichment, which alienated Somoza from the middle- and upper-class of 
Nicaragua—a sector of the population crucial to maintaining control in the country.222 
Somoza’s corruption seemed to have no bounds.  He reportedly used any method 
necessary to remain in power, including buying votes, ballot box stuffing, and even 
rewriting Nicaragua’s Constitution.  Electoral fraud was a legacy of the Somoza family 
regime, which was part of the already repressive and exclusionary government.  In 1974, 
Somoza even brought criminal charges against election boycotters (fueled by Pedro 
Joaquin Chamorro’s news reports in La Prensa) and declared nine parties illegal.  
Allegedly, his henchmen paid people off, which resulted in a 20 to 1 victory for Somoza 
that year.223 Somoza’s cynicism and sense of impunity knew no bounds – rather than 
deny accusations of electoral fraud, he instead replied to his accusers who had called him 
a “son of a bitch”:  “You won the election, but you lost the count.  And the bigger son of 
a bitch is he who loses what he’s won.”224  The combination of natural disaster and 
corruption fueled economic decline in the 1970s, exacerbated by the fact that too much 
money was being spent on the National Guard, while capital fled Nicaragua due to the 
growing FSLN threat.  Guerrillas attacked large farms and power plants, which 
contributed to the destabilization of the economy.225 
Somoza’s poor leadership was likewise revealed through his handling of highly 
successful opposition actions.  When the FSLN seized a number of Nicaraguan and 
foreign officials during a dinner party in late 1974, Somoza responded by declaring a 
state of siege, which critics characterized as a campaign of state sponsored counter terror.  
Somoza-directed repression attracted the condemnation of the international community 
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during 1975 and 1976, “when priests testified before Congress about Guard atrocities.”226  
During the state of siege, the regime did not distinguish between moderate and radical 
opposition.  While this campaign of repression directed at the FSLN was partially 
successful (causing the split of the FSLN into three factions), his aggressive actions 
alienated many in the populace.227  Additionally, when Somoza experienced a heart 
attack in the summer of 1977, he sent the wrong message to his countrymen when he fled 
to Miami to be seen by doctors—which simply called attention to Nicaragua’s inadequate 
medical care.  Moreover, the heart attack also made him seem vulnerable both among the 
opposition and the general populace.228 
Following the dramatic September 1978 seizure of the legislative palace by the 
FSLN, Somoza’s aggressive reaction, once again, further shocked the population and the 
international community.  Between the unprecedented success of the FSLN operation and 
Somoza’s poor leadership, the guerrilla ranks multiplied.  Stories of atrocities carried out 
by the National Guard spread in both the domestic and international realm.  One survivor 
of the post-September 1978 crackdown recalled, “I could see what they did to my mother 
after they killed her—they slit her stomach open with a bayonet.  They cut off the 
genitals of my brother-in-law and stuffed them in his mouth.”229  When the OAS human 
rights team arrived to investigate the atrocities and later reported on the many inhumane 
actions of the Somoza regime, the anti-Somoza sentiment boiled over into spontaneous 
uprisings, which further added to opposition ranks.  In other words, like Batista in Cuba, 
Somoza’s excessive repression alienated him from all of Nicaraguan society.230 
During the FSLN’s final offensive, launched in mid-1979, Somoza’s Guardsmen 
responded by rocket-bombing slums and indiscriminately killing women and children.  
After years of atrocities aimed toward the FSLN, the National Guard was accustomed to 
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treating all civilians as enemies.  Between the pressure from the OAS, the Carter 
administration, the Nicaraguan citizens, and the perception that the FSLN was on the 
verge of defeat, Somoza eased the pressure on opposition groups.  This miscalculation 
(among others) allowed the opposition to regroup, extend its support network, and 
ultimately allowed it to take power in Nicaragua.231 
2. FSLN’s Leadership 
The initial leaders and founders of the FSLN in 1961 (Carlos Fonseca Amador, 
Tomas Borge, and Silvio Mayorga) were all instrumental to the opening stages of the 
movement. But of the three, Fonseca was the most recognized for consistent and 
influential leadership.  He promoted Marxist concepts while resuscitating a national 
hero—Augusto Cesar Sandino—as the inspiration and precedent for the FSLN 
insurgency.  Fonseca’s strategy of invoking the example of Sandino both minimized and 
legitimized the Marxist ideology, which proved to be among the most important IO 
decisions of the organization.  It was Fonseca’s drive, inspired by the precedent of the 
Cuban Revolution, and his ability to articulate the movement’s program that made him 
the most recognized leader of the FSLN.232   
In 1960, Fonseca had received guerrilla training from a surviving veteran of 
Sandino’s original army.  Although the FSLN experienced multiple failures at the 
beginning, Fonseca’s leadership and his influence among his followers permitted the 
FSLN to continue to fight in spite of daunting odds.233  While the FSLN suffered many 
setbacks as Somoza’s repression was successful, in late 1974 Fonseca was able to deliver 
a major blow to the Somoza regime when the FSLN attacked a party in honor of U.S. 
Ambassador Turner B. Shelton.  Although Shelton had departed the party minutes earlier, 
the FSLN took multiple Nicaraguan and foreign officials hostage.  Somoza gave in to all 
of the movement’s requests, which emboldened the FSLN, increased popular support for 
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the opposition, and showed the Nicaraguan populace that Somoza’s government was 
vulnerable.  Following this successful attack, Somoza retaliated by launching a state-
terror campaign, during which, in 1976, Fonseca was killed fighting the National 
Guard.234   
Military pressure by the National Guard combined with Fonseca’s death split the 
FSLN into three factions.  Among the more prominent leaders that rose from this split 
were Daniel and Humberto Ortega—spearheads of the ultimately successful Tercerista 
faction.  The Ortega brothers were able to create a broad ideological umbrella that united 
those in Nicaragua—and there were many—who hated Somoza.235 
Eden Pastora (“Commandante Zero”) was a notable leader and member of the 
Tercerista group who organized the seizure of the Legislative Palace in 1978, which 
amplified support for the movement and elevated Pastora as one of the opposition’s 
idolized leaders.236  Following Pastora’s successful attack, the FSLN membership 
inflated to approximately 7,000.  The group unified once again under Tercerista ideology 
in March 1979, and increasingly gained international support from Cuba, Mexico, 
Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama—among other countries.  During this reunification 
period, the leadership began to broadcast radio messages, which successfully spread the 
movement’s agenda.  Between “Radio Sandino” and “Radio Reloj,” the group was not 
only able to increase support, but also became exceedingly proficient at sending 
clandestine/coded messages to active guerrillas in regional fronts.237  According to 
Wickham-Crawley, the Sandinistas viewed radio broadcasting as an ‘“essential medium 
for creating and accelerating revolutionary conditions’…. The Sandinistas even argued 
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that the use of radio went beyond simple communication, in helping to create a culture of 
resistance to the Somoza regime.”238     
The FSLN launched its final offensive in mid-1979. The regime’s reacted, as in 
the past, with indiscriminate violence, which further fueled the anti-Somoza/National 
Guard sentiment in Nicaragua and the international community.  The eventual 
disintegration of the Somoza regime allowed for the FSLN to march on Managua and 
take control of Nicaragua.239 
B. POPULAR SUPPORT 
1. Somoza’s Popular Support 
The success of the revolution was due in large part to the fact that Somoza did not 
value the need to maintain support and legitimacy among the population.  Popular 
support ebbed away from Somoza and toward the FSLN, beginning with universities, 
then the countryside (squatters and peasants), the working class, and ending with the 
middle- and upper-class.  It came to encompass the majority of the population and bled 
into the international community.240  As Douglas Porch notes, there was a “near universal 
loathing for the Somoza dynasty, generalized across class, race, party, and countries in 
the region.”241  
As previously indicated, popular support for the Somoza regime was undermined 
by the popular perception that the Dictator allowed foreign interests to exploit the 
country’s people and resources.  Also, the growing and irrefutable evidence that 
Somoza’s dictatorship committed crimes and acts of brutality against the Nicaraguan 
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populace, spearheaded by the National Guard, added to the overall discontent and 
deterioration of popular support. 242 
The Roman Catholic Church also contributed to the growing popular 
dissatisfaction with the Somoza government.  The Second Vatican Council (1963–1965) 
opened the door to the ideas of “dependency” and its effects on the poor.243  The birth of 
liberation theology, which focused on the poor and not the rich, established an 
atmosphere that increased expectations among peasants in Central America.244  The 
“conscientizacion” that liberation theology established became a catalyst for 
revolutions.245  Moreover, priests and nuns began to publicly criticize the Somoza 
regime, led by a Roman Catholic bishop in Nicaragua who publicly condemned 
Somoza’s fraudulent actions during the 1964 elections.246 The knowledge that Somoza 
was living a luxurious lifestyle, while the population experienced high rates of 
unemployment (30 percent in 1979) and were in need of basic subsistence items 
contributed to the overall discontent.  The aftermath of the 1972 earthquake, discussed 
above, was the last straw for many Nicaraguans,247 who nevertheless had to suffer the 
indignities of the Somoza’s National Guard, which post-1974 tortured and murdered 
Nicaraguans suspected of helping the FSLN.248  Concurrently, in 1974, the 
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aforementioned election fraud added to the increasing discontent toward the Somoza 
regime and increased support for the opposition.249  
The domino effect continued against the Somoza regime when, in January of 
1978, a disgruntled pro-Somoza business owner assassinated the famous editor of La 
Prensa, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro.  While Somoza was not directly responsible for his 
death, he was blamed for the murder and continued to lose public support.  Shortly after, 
anti-Somoza protests brought more negative attention to the regime.250   
Another blow to the regime’s popular support was the successful seizure of the 
National Palace in August 1978.  These actions were viewed as heroic due to the 
guerrilla’s ability to make Somoza negotiate and cave-in to their demands.  This in-turn 
increased support for the FSLN among the teenage population of Nicaragua.  
Spontaneous insurgent actions ballooned to their highest levels and FSLN recruitment 
was too high for the movement to absorb.251  
2. FSLN’s Popular Support 
The growth in dissatisfaction with the Somoza regime significantly contributed to the 
rise in support for the FSLN.  In most of the examples above where the Somoza regime lost 
support, the FSLN concurrently became more popular.  Popular support for the FSLN was 
very low during its inception because of the poor efforts of communicating their objective 
and purpose to the populace.  As DeFronzo explains, “the FSLN in the 1960s [early days of 
the movement] was little more than a small group of highly committed radicals bent on 
armed revolution but lacking the enthusiastic support of the people, the only possible means 
of victory against a well-trained and well-equipped National Guard.”252 
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Although support for the movement began in universities, major growth in 
popular support for the FSLN came from the peasants in the countryside, who were the 
most socially and economically repressed in the population.  The squatter population in 
the North-central Mountains provided a bulk of the active supporters.253  As previously 
noted, the FSLN’s raid in December 1974 was one of the major sparks that magnified the 
movement’s popular support.254  Jaime Wheelock, the leader of the Proletarian (los 
Proletarios) faction, noticed that: 
By 1974 these great, oligarchic, economic groups were ready to share 
power with Somoza, but what happened was that Somoza did not wish it. 
Then at the same time we could raise the banner of national liberation and 
unite all the people.  One didn’t try to say “Well, it is class struggle.” No! 
“It is a struggle for democracy and national liberation, against the 
Somocista dictatorship.”255  
From 1977, the FSLN realized that a more moderate message increased their 
support base and helped them gain the backing they needed to unite the majority of 
Nicaraguans against Somoza.256  By the end of 1978, the preponderance of news 
reporters realized the same trend in Nicaragua: ‘“popular sentiment is overwhelmingly 
behind the Sandinistas.”’257  Furthermore, another example of the interlinked changeover 
of popular support between the Somoza regime and the FSLN was the movement’s raid 
on the National Palace in August 1978.  The success of this raid significantly boosted 
support for the FSLN, amplified the limitations of the regime, and motivated the 
populace to be active participants in the revolution.258 
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C. EXTERNAL INFLUENCE 
Much like the Cuban Revolution, the United State was a continuous and 
significant external influence on the Nicaraguan Revolution.  The US’ early intervention 
(directly and indirectly) through occupation and persistent intrusion in Nicaragua’s 
political structure set the foundation for the Somoza family dynasty.259  According to 
LaFeber, “the Somoza dynasty had been a subsidiary of the United States since 1936.”260  
It was also because of their intervention in the early twentieth century that the first 
Sandinista insurgents were created—under Augusto Sandino himself.  During Sandino’s 
insurgency, the United States established and trained the National Guard, who eventually 
helped the Somoza family dictatorship remain in power.261  
By the early 1960s, with the shadow of the successful Cuban Revolution (1959) 
and communism taking hold in the leftist governments of Guatemala and Cuba, the 
relationship between the United States and Latin America was at an all time low.  On 
March 13, 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced his answer for improving 
Washington’s relationship with Latin America—the Alliance for Progress.  The ten-year, 
multibillion-dollar program was intended to “improve literacy, land use, industrial 
productivity, health, and education in Latin America.”262  Unfortunately, the Alliance for 
Progress had the opposite effect in Nicaragua.263  As LaFeber posited, “the Alliance was 
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inadvertently helping the Nicaraguans lose the capacity to feed themselves.”264  Worse, 
the program raised expectations without meeting them.  It failed to deal with the root 
problem of poverty in Nicaragua, and enflamed the revolutionary spirit of Central 
America as a whole.265  
Adding to the worsening situation, the oil crisis in the 1970s further contributed to 
the economic downturn in Nicaragua.  Moreover, during the same decade, Jimmy Carter 
was elected president of the United States and stressed a new form of foreign policy—a 
policy dedicated to human rights.  President Carter’s new dedication to human rights 
gave him no choice but to address continuing concerns about Nicaragua’s National Guard 
human rights violations.  The contradiction of pushing to protect human rights, while still 
providing $2.5 million worth of arms to the National Guard in 1977, only enflamed the 
insurgent momentum.266   
Towards the end of Somoza’s reign, the United States’ attempt to mediate a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict, persuade Somoza to liberalize, and keep the peace 
until the 1981 elections proved futile.  Between the FSLN’s demands and Somoza’s 
intransigence, nothing worked.267  With no logical conclusion to the dilemma in 
Nicaragua, Washington pressured Somoza to leave the country, and cutoff military and 
economic aid to his government—a move viewed as the “final straw” or the 
“psychological shock” that ended Somoza’s dictatorship.268  By 1979, public knowledge 
of the U.S. position toward Somoza helped to spark more anti-Somoza sentiment in 
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Nicaragua and in the region, which advanced the already inevitable conclusion of the 
Revolution.269   
The Roman Catholic Church, a persuasive external influence in Latin America, 
contributed to the decrease in popular support for Somoza and promoted class-warfare in 
Nicaragua that fit Carlos Fonseca’s Marxist ideology and promoted the FSLN’s cause.270  
As noted by LaFeber, anti-Church pamphlets would appear in Central America with 
slogans such as, “Be a patriot! Kill a priest!”271  The Nicaraguan archdiocese further 
promoted the anti-Somoza/National Guard feeling in the country, between 1975–1976, 
when priests testified to Congress about the Guard’s atrocities and Nicaragua’s 
archbishop issued a pastoral letter condemning Somoza’s National Guard’s brutalities.272  
Another previously mentioned external factor was the 1972 earthquake.  While 
the earthquake itself was not a direct cause of the pro-revolution sentiment in Nicaragua, 
Somoza’s opportunistic corruption made this external event a critical downturn for the 
regime’s popular support—principally among the middle- and upper-class.  Theorists 
note this event as being a major catalyst to Somoza’s demise.273 
Neighboring countries also played a role in the success of the Nicaraguan 
Revolution.  From the beginning, the FSLN founders used Honduras and Cuba as safe 
havens to launch their anti-Somoza operations.  As the insurgency progressed and 
Somoza continued to lose support among his neighbors, many countries supported for 
insurgency.  Panama, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Mexico sent arms to the FSLN.  Costa 
Rican President Jose Figueres allowed the FSLN to establish a government-in-exile 
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(Government for National Reconstruction, GNR) in San Jose to prepare for the transition 
of government near the end of the revolution. Figueres also facilitated the reunification of 
the three FSLN factions back under the Terceristas.  Mexico contributed to Somoza’s 
downfall by cutting off all relations with his regime and urging other nations to 
discontinue support as well, which led Brazil to follow suit.  Cuba became a more active 
contributor to the Nicaraguan Revolution during the FSLN’s final offensive in 1979 by 
sending 150 tons of munitions to the insurgents.  Furthermore, on June 23, 1979, the 
OAS voted to demand Somoza’s resignation and rejected U.S. President Carter’s request 
of deploying OAS peacekeeping forces to Nicaragua.274   
Lastly, much as in Cuba, the media contributed to the Nicaraguan Revolution by 
influencing both domestic and international support.  While the domestic media, 
particularly La Prensa, was an active anti-Somoza voice piece for the opposition, the 
televised public killing of ABC newsman Bill Stewart by the National Guard amplified 
the media’s effect on the revolution.  This event magnified the atrocities of the Somoza 
regime to the international community, which contributed to a significant drop in 
transnational support for the government.  This has been widely noted as a major event 
that left the United States no choice but to publicly denounce Somoza’s government and 
withdraw support.275 
D. MILITARY FACTORS 
1. History of Military 
During the early twentieth century, turmoil in Nicaragua caused the United States 
to deploy U.S. Marines to restore peace and ensure order.  General Augusto Sandino, 
who did not approve of U.S. forces mediating in domestic problems, engaged U.S. 
Marines and established a support and operating base in the mountains along the 
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Honduran border.  During the 1920s, the United States established, trained, and equipped 
Nicaraguan forces to provide protection in Nicaragua and serve as a combined police and 
military force.276  This force was named the Guardia Nacional (National Guard) and was 
established to “be loyal not to any one man or political party but to a democratic national 
constitution.”277  Jeffrey Paige eloquently summarized the origins of the National Guard 
by positing:  
The National Guard, trained and initially paid and led by the United 
States, formed the core of a state that did not reflect the interests of the 
traditional landed oligarchy, the modernizing coffee bourgeoisie or even 
foreign capital.  Its origins were strategic and military, not economic.278 
The hope of a loyal and constitutionally faithful force was unfortunately 
condemned from the beginning when Anastasio Somoza Garcia was chosen to lead them.  
His use of the National Guard for personal ends and his mafiacratic methods fostered a 
corrupt and unprofessional officers corps, whose attitudes were quickly reflected in the 
lower ranks.  In January 1933, the Marines pulled out of Nicaragua, leaving the National 
Guard in control of the security in the nation.  The following year, guardsmen 
assassinated General Sandino as he was leaving peace negotiations and scattered his 
forces.279   
Throughout the Somoza family’s reign, the National Guard continued to be the 
regime’s faithful strong-arm and pillar of the government’s system of plunder.  The 
corruption and brutality of the National Guard toward not only the political opposition 
but also against the general population contributed greatly to Somoza’s unpopularity.  
The privileges granted to the National Guard by Somoza isolated them from their fellow 
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citizens.280  Somoza’s use of the military was less about the protection of the country and 
more about “bleeding” Nicaragua of all its spoils.   
2. Professionalism of Nicaraguan Military  
Claribel Alegria and D.J. Flakoll argue that, “Somoza deliberately fostered 
military corruption to put enmity between the Guard and the public, and to create an 
officer corps in which the principal criterion for promotional success and personal 
enrichment was unconditional loyalty to ‘El Jefe.’”281  As noted, Somoza used the 
National Guard to buy or steal from all sectors of Nicaragua and allowed Guardsmen to 
do the same.282  For instance, during the 1972 earthquake, the National Guard used their 
power to line the pockets of its leaders.  While the Nicaraguan populace attempted to 
recover from the wreckage, National Guardsmen reportedly engaged in criminal activity, 
theft, and the sales of construction supplies provided by the international community.  
They also sold much needed medical supplies that arrived from non-profit international 
organizations.  The obvious misuse of power in the case of the National Guard 
significantly contributed to the mistrust and growing criticism for the government.283   
The hatred for the National Guard reached new heights during the state of siege 
from 1974 to 1977, which had been triggered by a successful FSLN home raid.  The 
National Guard—the main instrument of state ruthlessness during the siege—carried out 
tortures and murderers of hundreds of peasants believed to have been associated with the 
FSLN.  They also attacked neighborhoods where FSLN support or presence was 
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allegedly highest, using planes, tanks, and artillery.  Although the repression experienced 
a lull, in part as a response to President Carter’s human rights campaign, it was 
reinvigorated again in 1978 by another successful FSLN attack—the seizure of the 
Legislative Palace.  When the National Guard resumed their operations against the 
opposition and continued to make no distinction between guerrillas and citizens, the 
population began spontaneously resisting them.284   
While from an outside perspective, the National Guard seemed to be a well-
trained and effective force, in fact the corruption among the ranks along with distrust in 
society created an unprofessional and mistrusted institution that began to weaken from 
within.   As human right violations mounted against the Somoza regime as a result of 
National Guard atrocities, both began to lose regional support.285  By August 1978, 
“there were widespread reports of large-scale desertions from the guard, although 
Somoza denied them.”286  In early 1979, the National Guard’s institutional weakness 
began to catch up to them.  They lost several cities to the growing FSLN force and 
resorted to more extreme measures—bombing cities, neighborhoods, and destroying 
homes, factories, and businesses.  On June 20, 1979, the indiscriminate killing of 
civilians was elevated to the international realm when a National Guardsmen killed ABC 
reporter Bill Stewart.  The televised incident left President Carter no choice but to 
completely withdraw economic and military support for the Somoza government—a 
psychological blow to the regime, which further destroyed morale within the National 
Guard and boosted FSLN determination.  This was compounded when the United States 
and other countries requested that Somoza step down in order to organize a peaceful 
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transition of power.287  As noted by Jeff Goodwin, the National Guard had become 
“ineffectual and even counterproductive” in their actions against the opposition.288 
By mid-July 1979, the morale, solidarity, and discipline in the National Guard 
reached its lowest point when Somoza fled to Miami.289  As Wickham-Crowley 
described, and comparable to the Cuban Revolution, “in many provincial outposts near 
the end, soldiers simply refused to fight, and low morale and desertion came regularly in 
the regime’s last several months.”290  A disintegrating National Guard force was soundly 
defeated by the FSLN.  Their downfall was the final linchpin holding the lingering 
Somoza regime together.  Once Managua—the capital—was occupied by FSLN forces, 
the last nail on the Somoza government’s “coffin” was hammered.291 
In sum, this chapter covered the specifics behind the leading causes that led to the 
triumph of the Nicaraguan Revolution.  A focused historical analysis on the Sandinista 
revolution strengthened the hypothesis of this thesis by organizing the major contributing 
events along four main factors—leadership, popular support, external factors, and 
military impact.  Somoza’s poor and mafiacratic leadership allowed the FSLN to gain the 
upper hand in the fight for popular support.  External factors such as the intervention by 
the United States, the Roman Catholic Church, and neighboring countries also 
contributed to the domestic and international environment, which helped (directly and/or 
indirectly) the FSLN gain power in Nicaragua.  Lastly, the employment of the National 
Guard for the personal benefit of the Somoza family, the lack of professionalism within 
the ranks, and the massive corruption and brutality that branded all Guardsmen 
significantly contributed to the growth in support and numbers of the FSLN and collapse 
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of the regime.  Towards the end of the Nicaraguan Revolution, the ineffective, 
demoralized, and institutionally weak National Guard could not contain the growing 
opposition, which resulted in the disintegration of both the state and its defenses.  The 
simultaneous effects of these critical factors created an environment conducive to the 
revolution’s success in Nicaragua and an end to the Somoza dynasty.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has sought to address the conundrum that, while both left and right 
shared the view that endemic social and economic inequality, combined with political 
exclusion to make Latin America a receptive environment for revolution in the cold war 
era, insurgencies succeeded in toppling incumbent governments there in only two 
instances.  There are, of course, multiple and country-specific reasons for revolutionary 
failure. However, this thesis has sought to explain the two insurgent successes—those of 
Cuba in 1959 and Nicaragua two decades later.  These exceptional insurgent successes 
flowed from: the confluent impacts of leadership (strategy); popular support (the ability 
of the insurgents to assemble a popular constituency for their message and program with 
concomitant erosion of support for the incumbent regime); external factors (degree of 
support in the international environment, in particular from the United States); and the 
ability of incumbent regime armed forces to fight off the often ill-organized, even 
amateurish in operational terms, challenges of these two insurgent movements.  It 
underlines the fact that military efficiency is, after all, a relative concept.  
This thesis has adopted the view that history if considered in a detached way can 
educate the minds of soldiers and policymakers to analyze conflicts in their historical 
context, while at the same time identifying the generic commonalities of success or 
failure.  Theorists of revolution generally fall into five major categories of explanation—
Marxist; frustration-aggression; systems theory; crises of modernization; and structural 
explanation.  Those whose job it is to counter-revolutions may gravitate to the CIA’s 
insurgent life cycle model, which this thesis sought to explain.  But theory takes one only 
so far, so that an understanding of the historical background of both of these insurgent 
successes becomes critical to understanding the outcome.  This thesis has sought to 
demonstrate why Batista in Cuba and Somoza in Nicaragua lost popular support through 
their policies and actions, and how the M-26-7 in Cuba and the FSLN in Nicaragua were 
able to take advantage of regime deficiencies and missteps.   
This thesis has argued that the regimes of Batista and Somoza were unmitigated 
disasters in the contrast of modern democratic states able to deliver services to their 
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population, protect them against subversion, and be accountable through a modern 
democratic process for the outcome.  This thesis has identified as a failure of leadership 
each regime’s inability or unwillingness to reform which led over time to their weakening 
and ultimate downfall.  Concomitantly, the ability of revolutionary leaders to structure 
their organizations, through democratic outreach, for the purpose of appeasing important 
disgruntled and alienated social groups and military efficiency—taking advantage of their 
opponents’ weaknesses—must also count as a leadership strength.  In many respects, 
leadership like military efficiency is a relative term.  Castro was a romantic and narcissist 
who twice previously had failed to precipitate revolution in Cuba.  However, from 1957 
if not before, Batista’s poor leadership allowed Castro and his M-26-7 to organize an 
opportunistic campaign crowned ultimately with success, one gained largely because the 
Cuban military had become so corrupt and demoralized under Batista that it proved 
unable to protect an unpopular and delegitimized regime from an insurgent group under 
opportunistic yet charismatic leaders. As a result, the repressive, corrupt and 
unprofessional Cuban armed forces that attempted to rout the M-26-7 guerrillas were 
swiftly defeated, which sealed the fate of Batista’s regime and produced the triumph of 
what was to become a Castro family dynasty.   
Substituting Somoza for Batista, the Nicaraguan Revolution followed a similar 
but more tortured trajectory.  Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s corrupt and brutal leadership 
almost makes Batista appear to have been a benign despot. Nevertheless, the ability of 
multiple FSLN leaders—Carlos Fonseca, Daniel and Humberto Ortega, and Eden 
Pastora—to take advantage of Somoza’s considerable shortcomings was hardly 
foreordained.  On the contrary, it took time for Somoza’s craven use of Nicaragua’s finite 
resources for personal gain to allow for anti-Somoza sentiment to flourish and to increase 
overall opposition toward the regime.  In both cases, the erosion of middle class support, 
including the military, for the regime that proved critical.  In other words, a popular 
peasant base for revolution as embraced by theorists of revolution, while necessary, is 
insufficient.  This shift in popular support was also mirrored in the international 
community, which eventually withdrew support for Somoza’s government and even 
promoted FSLN objectives—the removal of Somoza and the National Guard from power 
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in Nicaragua.  Much like the Cuban army, Nicaragua’s National Guard was deeply 
detested by the Nicaraguan populace for their corruption, repression, and overall 
aloofness to society.  As in Cuba, a prolonged campaign against their own population in 
support of an obviously corrupt dictator undermined the morale and institutional strength 
of the National Guard.  Poor morale caused in great part by its disconnection from its 
social base translated into a lack of discipline that contributed to the complete 
disintegration of the Somoza regime and rise of the FSLN.   
Of course, all insurgencies are unique, as are the circumstances of their success or 
failure.  Cuba in 1959 and Nicaragua in 1979 are hardly Afghanistan, Iraq, or Columbia 
(to name but a few) in our modern era.  The contribution of this thesis has been to 
identify certain characteristics of two successful examples of insurgency to better 
understand some critical factors that may aid in analyzing revolutionary outcomes.  
While this thesis focused on two successful Latin American revolutions, further research 
is required to reach a deeper understanding of current insurgencies worldwide in regards 
to the four major factors presented here (leadership, popular support, external factors, and 
military).  These four interrelated factors also offer a method of studying insurgent 
events, which can provide insight and a basic foundation to apply strategic, operational, 
and tactical COIN techniques.  
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